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Abstract
Harrison,  Rutherford,  Tarr, and Gurgel  estimate that  The agreement with the  EU is almost twice  as valuable
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA),  the  for Brazil  as the FTAA,  but this conclusion  depends on
EU-MERCOSUR  agreement,  and multilateral  trade  the EU providing tariff free access to its agricultural
policy  changes will all' be beneficial  for Brazil.  The  markets  as part of the agreement.  If the United States  and
Brazilian  government strategy of simultaneously  the  EU do not permit access  to their most highly
negotiating  the FTAA and  the EU-MERCOSUR  protected  markets, the FTAA will be  much more valuable
agreement,  while supporting multilateral  liberalization  to Brazil  than the EU-MERCOSUR  agreement.  The
through the Doha Agenda, will increase  the benefits of  FTAA contains  a large number of markets outside  of the
each of these policies.  United States,  so there remains a lot of value  in the
The authors estimate that the poorest  households  FTAA  for Brazil,  even if the United States protects  its
typically gain roughly three  to four times the average  for  most highly protected markets.
Brazil from any of the policies considered.  This is  Both  the FTAA and the EU-MERCOSUR  agreements
because the structure of tariff protection  in Brazil favors  are  net trade-creating for the countries  involved,  but
capital-intensive  manufacturing.  Tariff liberalization  in  excluded  countries almost always lose from  the
Brazil will shift production toward labor-intensive  agreements.  The authors estimate that multilateral  trade
manufacturing  and agriculture.  Due to the increase  in  liberalization of 50  percent  in tariffs  and export subsidies
demand for labor intensive sectors, the wage  rate of  results  in gains to the world more than four times greater
unskilled labor will  increase, and the primary  than either the FTAA or the EU-MERCOSUR
determinant  of the impact on  the poor from  trade  agreement.  This shows the continued  importance  to the
liberalization  is the wage  rate of unskilled labor.  world trading community  of the multilateral
negotiations.
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1. Introduction
Regional, multilateral and unilateral trade policy options are all on the table for the
government of Brazil. In terms of regional arrangements, Brazil is part of the MERCOSUR  customs
union along with Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Negotiations  to implement the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas  (FTAA) with the MERCOSUR countries  as members are underway.
The most notable bilateral regional arrangement that MERCOSUR  is negotiating is a potential free
trade  agreement with the European Union  (EU). Brazil has also supported further multilateral
negotiations  within the World Trade Organization (WTO).'  Brazil is a member of the Caims group
supporting agricultural trade liberalization and believes that the best negotiating forum for obtaining
freer agricultural markets is the WTO. The WTO agreement to launch the Doha Development
Agenda suggests that further multilateral  trade liberalization is likely. Finally, although political
support for unilateral trade liberalization  in Brazil and MERCOSUR may be less evident, each has
undertaken  considerable unilateral trade liberalization in the last ten years. Several Brazilian scholars2
have noted a significant increase in Brazilian productivity associated with the trade liberalization,  and
this has cemented the intellectual support for an open trade regime.
As MERCOSUR considers its trade policy options over the next few years, it would be
useful for Brazilian policy-makers  to have an assessment of some of the following questions.  What
is the impact of the FTAA or the potential EU-MERCOSUR free trade agreement? If the EU
excludes agricultural products from the agreements,  or if the US applies antidumping actions to its
most protected sectors, do the agreements lose their attractiveness?  What are the potential  gains
from multilateral liberalization  compared with regional liberalization?  How can Brazil and
MERCOSUR  optimally choose the combination of trade policy options? Would the FTAA and the
EU-MERCOSUR  agreement yield greater benefits taken together than separately?  How much would
further unilateral liberalization contribute to improved welfare,  either independently  or in
l See the  Trade Poeg Reziewfor Bra#1  by the World Tra de Organization  [20001.
2  For example, Rossi and Ferreira  [1999].combination with regional arrangements?  We provide quantitative  estimates to answer these and
other questions.
It is well known that most results regarding the welfare  effects of regional arrangements  are
typically ambiguous at the theoretical level, and that many quesions are quantitative rather than
qualitative. Thus we employ a 16-region global computable general  equilibrium  (CGE) model to
quantitatively examine the regional, unilateral and multilateral  arrangements. Our model includes the
Brazilian economy as well as the economies  of Argentina,  Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, the United States,
Canada, Central America, Venezuela,  Colombia, Peru, Rest of Andean Pact, Rest of South America,
the EU, Japan and an aggregate Rest of the World. We aLre  therefore able to estimate the impact on
partner and excluded countries from each of the agreements we evaluate.
Given the concern about the impact of trade policy changes on the poor, a significant focus
of our work is on the impact of the trade policy  changes under consideration on the poor. To do sc),
we incorporate  20 different types of Brazilian househokLs  in our model:  ten rural and ten urban,
where rural and urban households are further dassified according to income levels.  Our work in
this area is innovative most notably in several empirical dimensions,  as we describe in Appendices A,
C and D. It is only as a result of the careful attention to detail in the empirical work on factor shares
and income mapping from the survey data, that we are able to obtain results that can be sensibly
used to analyze the poverty dimension of trade policy changes in an applied setting.3
Our basic policy results are in Table 5A (in percentage terms) and Table 6A (in U.S. dollars).
The results suggest that the regional arrangements under consideration by MERCOSUR, namely the
FTAA and an agreement with the EU, can both be expected to res alt in gains to Brazil. That is, by
the standards of preferential trade arrangements,  these potential agreements  are relatively beneficial
(See Harrison, Rutherford  and Tarr [2002]  and Bakoup and Tarr [2000]  for quantitative assessments
that find negaive impacts of some regional arrangements.)  The agreement with the EU is almost
twice as valuable as the FTAA due to access to highly protected agricultural markets in the EU. The
combined gains from both agreements will be greater than the gains obtained from the sum of the
agreements  separately due to a reduction of trade diversion. This indicates  that the Brazilian strategy
of pursuing both agreements, rather than either alone, is beneficial.
3We show that the results  change considerably without proper attention to detail on the factor shares.
-2-Both the US and the EU, however,  may attempt to protect their markets  despite a
preferential trade agreement. What is the cost to Brazil of  denial of preferential market access to the
markets of the US or the EU? If the EU excludes it highly protected agricultural products from the
EU-MERCOSUR  agreement, the gains  to Brazil are reduced to only one-ninth of the value of the
gains with full preferential market access to the EU. If the US  employs antidumping to exclude
market access  to Brazil for the most protected products in the US, the gains to Brazil would be
reduced to two-thirds of the gains Brazil would obtain from full market access in a FTAA. If both
agreements  are implemented with excluded products, the FTAA will be more valuable to Brazil than
the agreement with the EU.
We find that both unilateral tariff cuts in MERCOSUR or tariff unifonnity in MERCOSUR
also yields benefits for Brazil. We estimate that uniform tariffs in MERCOSUR (such that collected
tariff revenue in Brazil is unchanged)  would yield benefits even larger than a unilateral 50% tariff cut
in MERCOSUR.
In the case of Brazil, we find that most of the trade policy options we evaluate, either
regional, multilateral or unilateral, result in a distribution of the gains to the different households
that is progressive,  so that the poorest households  experience  the greatest percentage increase in
their incomes. This is because trade policy changes in Brazil tend to shift resources from capital
intensive manufacturing toward unskilled labor intensive  agriculture  and manufacturing,  thereby
inducing an increase in the wage of unskilled labor relative to other factors of production.  In
general, the oil seeds, other agriculture  (excluding grains and wheat), other crops (which includes
fruits and vegetables and wheat), processed food and leather sectors expand production and exports,
while several manufacturing  sectors, including motor vehicles, other metal products  and the sector
we call manufacturing, decline. This reflects relative protection in Brazil, which favors capital
intensive manufacturing at the expense of agriculture and processed food products. When
protection is reduced in the economy, resources shift toward the agriculture  and food sectors that
had been disadvantaged  relative to manufacturing.  This in turn results in an increase in the incomes
of the poorest households in Brazil relative to the richest  The percentage increase in the incomes of
the eight poorest households  (the four poorest rural and four poorest urban) is several times greater
than the percentage increase  in the income of the average for the economy as a whole. At a very
disaggregate  level some poor households  could lose, especially in the short run. This emphasizes  the
need for effective safety net policies to be in place.  But given that the sectors that are important to
-3-the poor tend to be disfavored by the structure of protection, the riedium to long run effects of
these trade reforms should be very positive for the poorest households.4
Our estimates indicate that the apparent Brazilian  strategy of simultaneously pursuing a
MERCOSUR agreement with the EU plus the  FT-AA,  while supporting multilateral trade
liberalization  at the WTO, is well considered.  Brazd can optimize its choice of trade policies by
combining regional arrangements in both the Americas  and the EU with multilateral liberalization.  If
tariff uniformity is added to the regional  and m  alldateral  liberalizat on, further gains would be
realized.
Both the FTAA and the EU-MERCOSUR arrangements  are net trade-creating  for the
countries  involved, but excluded countries  almost always  lose from  the agreements.  We estimate that
multilateral trade liberalization  of 50 percent in tariffs  anrd export subsidies results in gains to the
world more than four times greater than either  the FTAA or the  E U-MERCOSUR agreement. This
shows the continued importance to the world trading community of the multilateral negotiations.
Our model does not incorporate growth or especially  endogenous  growth effects  of trade
policy.  Several Brazilian researchers,  Feijo and Carvalho  [1994]; Bonelli  and Fonseca  [1998],
Moreira [1999],  Rossi and Ferreira  [1999], Pinheiro and .Moreira [2000]  and Ferreira and Rossi
[2001], have noted a correlation between  the opening of Brazil to external  trade in the early 1990s
and an increase in productivity in Brazilian manufacturing.  Recently, Muendler  [2001]  has been able
to infer a causal relationship  between the trade ]iberali2ation and increase in total factor productivity.
This has contributed to the momentum for further trade liberalization  in Brazil. A model which
incorporated endogenous growth effects,  such as that developed in Rutherford and Tarr [2002],
would be expected  to produce gains from trade liberalization several  multiples of the estimated  gainIs
of our CRTS model. Numerical endogenous  growth models, however, are not yet available that carL
produce results at the sector or household level such as  is required of this analysis.  We therefore
adopt a more conventional  comparative static modeling approach.  We believe that in general that we
4 These results are consistent with two other ans lyses of the impact of irade hberalization  on the poor  in Brazil.
Barros, Corseuil and  Cury [2000]employed  a CGE model of BraziU calibrated  to  1995 data. They simulated an increase of
protection to the levels that prevailed  in Brazil in 1985. TIey find that trade  liberalizatnon benefits the economy as a
whole, but both the rural and urban poor gain more than proportioaately  from t-ade liberalization.
The large  study of rural poverty  in Brazil by the World Bank  [2001, p. i 7j  concludes  that "given that commercial
agriculture  produces the bulk of Brazil's  export crops.. .a trade policy regime that moves  toward relatively low tariffs on
importables (of both inputs and  final products)  could significantly improve the s:ctors international  competitiveness
which would in turn lead to greater real wage rates and increased  employment opportunities-both  farm and downstream
processing and transport."
-4-characterize the ranking of the results and the estimated  gains to the economy  (or losses in some
cases) would be a multiple of the gains or losses that we estimate.5 There  are, however,  exceptions
to this multiple benefits  or losses. It is likely that trade (direct and indirect)  vith technologically
advanced countries yields  greater increases  in productivity than trade with less advanced countries.
In this case, the FTAA could provide dynamic benefits for Argentina,  for example,  even though our
estimated static effects are negative.
In Section 2 we describe the model and  data. In Section 3 we present and explain the policy
results for Brazil, the implications  for the distribution of income, and the reallocation of output
among sectors.  Results for other countries in the model are also explained. The impact on partner
and excluded countries of the regional arrangements  are  also evaluated and compared to the impact
under multilateral trade liberalization.  In Section 4 we examine how the various  trade policy options
may be combined  to optimize the outcome for Brazil.  The conclusions  are in Section 5. Appendices
may be found on the website: http:/  /dmsweb.moore.sc.edu/Glenn/brazil/.
2. A Multi-Regional Trade Model
A. General Features
The quantitative model developed to evaluate the trade policy options facing Brazil is multi-
regional and multi-sectoral.  Table 1 lists the 16 regions included  explicitly in the model, as well as the
22 sectors included in each region. The model is quite detailed in the Americas:  there are  13
countries or regions in the Americas.  Outside of the Americas, we have European Union 15, Japan
and Rest of the World. This country specification incorporates  virtually all  the countries or regions
that are important to Brazilian trade policy. The general specification of this model follows  our
earlier multi-regional model of the effects  of the Uruguay Round  and even more closely our model
5We have evaluated most of the trade policy options in a "comparative  steady state" model, similar t o our work
with a comparative  steady state model on the Uruguay Round. But since the rental  rate on capital falls in most of our
scenarios, the new equilibrium  capital stock does not rise, and the estimated welfare gains  to the economy do not rise  as
well. In general,  the gains  do not necessarily have to increase in a  comparative  steady state model, as we  explain in
Rutherford and  Tarr [forthcoming,  2 003].
Some authors, such as Burfisher, Robinson and Theirfelder  [2002], posit  Micks neutral technical change as a
function of the share of GDP that is traded, or traded with industrial countries. Although this specification  will achieve
large welfare  estimates from  ttade liberalization,  we choose to avoid this specification  since it does not have any
microeconomic  foundation. It ignores  the innovation of the endogenous growth lit erature regarding technical change.
-5-of the trade policy options  for Chile.6 There are however,  several irnportant data and modeling
differences  between this research and our earlier  models. The most important innovation is the
extension to multiple households in Brazil. Multiple households in the model for Brazil allows us to
assess the distributional impacts of trade policy, not just tde aggrega.te  effects. In particular,  the
impact of trade policy options on the poor can be assessed due to thfe decomposition  of households.
Other than Brazil,  all economies are modeled in the more traditional manner in which all consumers
are represented by a "representative  agent."
We employ the "GTAP5  dataset,"7 but augment or alter the dataset in certain important
dimensions  to better capture the Brazilian economy. The GTAP  5 dataset employs trade data for
1997 and reconciles the data to be consistent with GDP and other macro data for 1997. With
respect to the data for Brazil, we update or modify the GTAP5 dataset in several dimensions.  The
most important are: we update to the 1996 input-output  table of thc Brazilian economy,  since the
GTAP5 database is based  on a 1985 input-output table for Brazil; we alter the protection data for
Brazil to more closely capture  the Brazilian economy (and we correct for some problems in the
protection data in some  other countries); we use the household expenditure survey for Brazil to
construct information on multiple households in Brazil; and  we have independendy estimated factor
shares in Brazilian industries. Key data at the level of productive sectors is described in Table 2.  We
elaborate on these extensions later and in the Appendices.,
We adopt a multi-region model, rather than a small open economy model,  since we need to
consider the possible effects on Brazil of a reduction in N{ERCOSUTR's  import tariffs on partner
countries.  Crucially, we also need to account for the "market access" effects  on Brazilian  exports of
a reduction of import tariffs by the EU,  NAFTA or other regions with which Brazil agrees to a free
trade agreement,  eitier separately or collectively.
Although the general theory of the welfare effects of preferential trading arrangements  does
allow for the impact of changes in partner country tariffs on the home country's terms-of-trade,8
6  Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr  [1997c][2002].  Web site IHTTP://DMSWEB.BADM.SC.EDU/GLENN/UR-PUB.HTM
provides access to the model and related publications.
7For documentation see Dimaranan and  McDougall  [200Z .Chapter 4 of this volume describes the contruction
of the protection  database.
s See Wooton  [1986]  and Harrison, Rutherford gnd Wooton  [1 989] [1993].
-6-some empirical approaches to evaluating preferential trading arrangements ignore them.9 Our
framework allows us to explicitly evaluate the importance to Brazil of improved market access to
regions such as the EU and the Americas,  as well as losses Brazil may suffer as partner countries
raise export prices to Brazil.
Although  there are numerous exceptions  to the common external tariff of MERCOSUR,
and in many cases it  is being phased in over time, we assume that the countries  of MERCOSUR
apply the common external tariff. Argentina and Uruguay are represented explicitly in our model,
while Paraguay is represented  as part of the Rest of South America.  Thus, we assume that there are
zero tariffs on the imports of goods between Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, and that all three of
these countries apply the common external tariff of MERCOSUR. We take the tariff rates of Brazil
(from the GTAP5 dataset)  as the common extemal tariff for all countries in MERCOSUR.  The
MFN tariff rates for all countries in our model are presented in Table 3.
In addition to MERCOSUR, we assume that NAFTA operates  as an effective free trade area
with zero tariffs among the U.S. Canada and Mexico,  but each of the three countries  has its own
external  tariff. Although there are many other regional preferential  trading arrangements  in the
Americas that are implemented at different levels of effectiveness,  our dataset does not incorporate
these preferential tariff rates. Further notes on the tariff rates in the GTAP5  dataset are presented in
Appendix B.
B. Formal Specification
The Model. The general  specification of the model follows  our earlier work on the Uruguay
Round and on Chile.  We concentrate here on what we have called our "base" model, which is static
and assumes constant returns to scale  (CRTS). 10 Apart from the fact that imports and exports  are
distinguished  by many regions and we have many households in the model, the structure of the
9 An example  is the approach adopted by Bond [1996].  He develops a simple  general equilibrium  specification
of the effects on Chile of these preferential trading arrangements with an impressive level of detail with respect to tariff
data.  His results for Chile joining NAFTA, however, differ significantly  from ours since his CGE model does not
incorporate the impact on Chile of access to NAFTA markets.
10  Given that we extend the multi-country, multi-region  framework to multiple households in Brazil, we  choose
to focus in this paper on CRTS  because we believe that is crucial to obtain a clear understanding of the basic
mechanisms through which trade policy changes impact on the poor in Brazil.  Extentions to  IRTS would certainly be of
interest, as well as  to endogenous growth and investment decisions to the extent feasible  as we discussed in the
introduction.
-7-model within any country is very close to the basic model of de Me]o and Tarr [1992]; the interested
reader may consult their chapter 3 for a detailed explanation  of the  zquations.
Briefly, production  entails the use of interrnediate inputs and primary factors  (Labor, Capital
and Land). Primary factors  ate mobile across sectors within a region, but are internationally
immobile.  We assume Constant Elasticity of Substitutiorn  (CES) production functions for value
added, and Leontief production functions for intennediates  and the value added composite.  Output
is differentiated between domlestic output and exports, but exports are not differentiated by country
of destination.
Except for Brazil, each region has a single repres,zntative  consumer who maximizes utility, as
well as a single government agent. In the case  of'Brazil there are 20 households:  ten rural and ten
urban. Urban and rural households  are distinguished by income levels, as  discussed below. In
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1 997b; Appendix  C]  we iFormally  ch aracterize the demand structure
and elasticities which are critical to the results. Demand is characterized by nested CES utility
functions for each agent, which allow multi-stage  budgeting. Demand at the top level, for the
composite "Armington" aggregate of each of the 22 goods in Table  1, is Cobb-Douglas.  Consumers
first choose how much of each Armington aggregate good to consume, such as wheat, subject to
aggregate incomes  and composite prices of the aggregate  goods. The initial expenditure  shares of
each of the 20 consumers determine the elasticity of demnand for each of the consumers'  demand
functions. These expenditure  shares  (which determine the household demand  elasticities)  differ
across households  and are presented in Table 4.  The elasticties of dlemand for each of the The
Armington aggregate good is in turn a CES composite o F  domestic production and aggregate
imports. Consumers decide how much to spend on aggregate imports and the domestic good
subject to the prior decision of how much income will be spent on this  sector, and preferences for
aggregate  imports and domestic goods are represented  by a CES utility function. Finally,  consumers
decide how to allocate  expenditures  across irnports from  the 15 other regions based on their CES
utility function for imports from different regions and income allocated  to consumption  on imports
from the previous higher level decision.
Regarding the households in Brazil, although the structure of demand is identical across
households,  the elasticities of demand with respect to prices differ across Brazilian households. This
is because the initial observed  expenditure pattems differ  across ho aseholds (see Table 4). Thus, the
-8-demand function parameters we solve for, in order to reconcile the observed  data with the assumed
functional form of the demand functions, differ across  households. 11
Several Brazilian researchers,  Feijo and Carvalho  [1994]; Bonelli and Fonseca  [1998],
Moreira [1999],  Rossi and Ferreira  [1999],  Pinheiro and Moreira  [2000]  and Ferreira and Rossi
[2001], have noted a correlation  between the opening of Brazil to external trade in the early 1990s
and an increase in productivity in Brazilian manufacturing.  Recently, Muendler  [2001] has been able
to infer a causal relationship between  the trade liberalization and increase in total factor productivity.
established a causal This has contributed  to the momentum for further trade liberalization in Brazil.
A model which incorporated endogenous  growth effects,  such as that developed in Rutherford and
Tarr  [2002], would be expected to produce gains from trade liberalization several multiples of the
estimated gains of our CRTS model. Numerical endogenous  growth models, however, are not yet
available that can produce results at the sector or household level such as is required of this analysis.
We therefore adopt a more conventional  comparative static modeling approach.  We believe that in
general that we characterize  the ranking of the results and the estimated gains to the economy (or
losses in some cases) would be a multiple of the gains or losses that we estimate.  There are,
however, exceptions to this multiple benefits or losses. It is likely that trade (direct and indirect) with
technologically advanced  countries yields greater increases in productivity than trade with less
advanced countries.  In this case, the FTAA could provide dynamic benefits for Argentina,  for
example, even though our estimated static effects are negative.
Data and Elasticities.  Except where we indicate otherwise,  we use the GTAP5 database
that is current as of November 2001. The 1  6-region version of the model retains  all regions of the
GTAP5 database that are directly relevant to our policy simulations. The full GTAP database
contains 57 sectors, but we have aggregated  to 22 sectors, which results in a model with
approximately  2,500 equations. Nonetheless, we have retained the sectors most important to
Brazilian trade policy, since we have retained  sectors with high protection in either the United
11  An interesing extension of our analysis would be to allow for non-unitary income elasticities  for the
different households within Brazil.  However, given the way that our demand system is calibrated, using base year
expenditure  shares, non-unitary income  elasticities would have very little impact on the results. The reason is that in the
policy simulations  we  examine the changes in real income are typically on the order of les s than 5%. Our judgement is
that the extra effort required  to calibrate to non-unitary  income elasticities  would not change our results noticeably,  but
this judgement should be verified in future work.
-9-States, the European Union or MERCOSUR.  R-etaining additional  sectors would be of interest to
analysts of those sectors  in Brazil, but as far as the welfare results are concerned, aggregating sectors
with similar protection  should not significantly  iaffect the  results."2
The share of value added attributed  to capital in  an industry is notoriously poorly
represented in input-output tables  (see Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [forthcoming,  2003] for
details). Consequently, we independently estimated  factor shares in Brazilian industries. Details are in
Appendix C. Key data on the structure of production from the upcdated input-output table, our
estimated factor shares, and export and import shares, are presented in Table 2. A summary of trade
weighted average tariffs by sectors  in our model and in the countries of our model is presented in
Table 3.
We generally assume that the lower-level elasticidvy of substitution between imports from
different regions,  CY.,  is 30 and that the higher-level elasticity between aggregate imports and
domestic production,  oD,  is  15.  We refer to these values as our central  elasticities. There are
econometric studies, such as those of Reinert and Roland-Holst [1992]  and Shiells and Reinert
[1993], that suggest values which are lower than  these. However, Reidel [1988]  and Athukorala and
Reidel [1994]  argue that when the model is properly  specified the demand elasticities  are not
statistically different from infinity, and their point estimates are dose to the central elasticity values
we have chosen."3 Moreover, elasticities would be expected  to increase over time, and this model
presumes an adjustment of about 10 years, a rather long period in the context of these econometric
estimates.
To be clear, a value of acM = 30 means  that if Brazil tried to raise its prices by 1% on world
markets relative to an average of aggregate imports, Brazilian imports would decline relative  to
aggregate  imports by 30%.  Given that there may be  sorn,e econorrists who would prefer lower
elasticiy estimates, we also perform most of our important policy simulations with auM = 8 and a
4.  We refer to these as  our low elasticities. In  our view, a high elasticity  scenario,  for an econormy
such as Brazil with little market power  on world markets in most products, would be a specification
12  That is, we aggregated  sectors which arc not important in trade or which have low rates  of protection. It is
known that aggregation may significantly change the results in appled trade policy analysis, but that this type of
aggregation results in quite small aggregation  bias in trade policy analysis. We acknowledge  that services is not treated
seriously in this model, but the companion work by our colleagues  fDcuses  on scrvices  Mattoo et al..  [2002].
13 In addition,  the estimates of Schiff and Chang [2003]  suggest that thz elasticities are high.with  still less market power for exports, such as would occur with in the popular theoretical models
of international  trade where goods are homogeneous.
The elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic production is assumed to be
about 5 for each sector.  Elasticities of substitution between primary factors of production is unity.
We assume fixed  coefficients between all intermediates and value added.
Distortions. All distortions are represented  as ad valorem price-wedges.  Border protection
estimates  combine tariff protection  and the tariff equivalents  of non-tariff barriers.
In Appendix B we explain in detail how we modified the GTAP5 data on protection to
better reflect the Brazilian structure of protection.  Appendix B shows that, outside of services,  the
GTAP tariff levels dosely reflect the legal MFN rates of the common external tariff of
MERCOSUR at the level of GTAP product categories. In addition, when we average over all
commodities, both the legal common external tariff of MERCOSUR on a most favored nation
(MFN)  basis and the GTAP collected tariff rate for countries  outside of MERCOSUR are between
12% and 13%.  In services,  however, the GTAP dataset contains both significant  subsidies to
imports in some services  sectors and significant tariffs  on other services imports. We judge neither
to be reasonable,  and impose zero  tariffs on services in our tariff database  for Brazil  (and for other
countries  as well). In addition, contrary to the GTAP database, we impose zero tariffs on imports
within MERCOSUR. After these corrections, the implied collected tariff in the corrected  GTAP
database is 9.2%, which is slightly larger than the actual collected tariff average in Brazil of about
8%.14 Remaining differences  in the collected rates reflect preferential arrangements not incorporated
in the GTAP database and exemptions to the tariff such as duty drawback.  We conclude  that our
MFN rates for BraziL are accurate and the  coLLected rates are close to actual collected  rates.
We employ the GTAP tariff rates for countries outside of  Brazil as well.  These tariff rates
are trade weighted average  tariffs, and consequently typically differ according to trading partner.
That is, since there are thousands of tariff lines in the tariff schedules of most countries,  literally
hundreds of tariff lines must be mapped into a single sector in the GTAP database. Since the
product mix of imports differs across  countries, the trade weighted average tariff rate will  differ
14 Collected  tariff information was obtained from both the Brazilian Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Development, Industry and International  Trade.
-11-according  to the country of origin.'5 It is possible to observe from Table 3 that agricultural
protection in the EU (and Japan) is relatively high, and this will play an important role in the
analysis. Although we impose the CET of Brazil for the external tariff of Argentina and Uruguay,
the trade weighted average tariff across all countries  is not precisely equal in all cases for the three
countries because of product mix differences  across sources of imports.
Other distortions include factor taxes in production, value-added taxes, export subsidies
(especially on agricultural exports from the EU, but to a limited extent elsewhere),  and export taxes
on textiles and apparel."6 It is generally believed that rents under the multi-fiber arrangement  are
captured by exporters, so these are represented  as ad valorem export tax equivalents.  In the case of
Brazil, the export taxes on textiles and wearing apparel are estimated to be four percent. Lump-sum
replacement  taxes or subsidies  ensure that government revenue in each region stays constant at real
benchmark  levels.
Brazilian Households.  Household expenditure and income patterns were extracted from
the  Living Standards  Measurement Survey (LSMS)  for Brazil. This survey was designed and
conducted  by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia  e Estatistica  (IBGE). The LSMS survey is a stratified
sample, where each household samples represents a share of the total population in the area
sampled. The LSMS  focused on the eastern part of Brazil, but it is estimated  to represent  103.6
million people in this region, 22.3 million rural people and 81.3 million urban people. This
constitutes  about 63% of the total population. Although much of the country is not sampled in the
LSMS, experts who have worked with the poverty data in Brazil believe the poor overall are
represented proportionally  in the sample, at least not under represented.'7 We calculate the Gini
coefficient  for the entire survey sample at 0.585 and we present Lorenz curves for the rural and
urban populations in our sample in Figure  1.
15  Take the GTAP category  motor vehicles and parts in Brazil as  an example. Imports of motor vehicles are
subject to a tariff of 35%. But motor vehicle parts, and tractors  are typically  subject to a tariff of 22% or lower.  If
country A exports mosdy parts to Brazil, its weighted  average tanff rate will not exceed 22 0/o.  If country B exports mostly
cars to Brazil its weighted average tariff on its exports  to Brazil will be about 35%.
16 The Uruguay Round made a great deal of progress  in eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade, especially in
agriculture.  The multi-fibre arrangement,  however, is one example of non-tariff barriers that remain. We assume that the
non-tariff barriers are not changed  by the trade policies under consideration.
17  We thank Peter Lanjouw and Francisco  Ferreira for helpful conversations  on several aspects of assessing
poverty in Brazil.
-12-We aggregated  the approximately  5000 Brazilian households  in the survey into twenty
households, ten urban and ten rural. Within rural and urban households, households were classified
according to household income from poorest to richest. Key characteristics  of the households  in the
LSMS survey are listed in Table 1.
The shares of income each household spent on each commodity group was extracted from
the LSMS. In addition, the shares of income each household obtained from capital,  rent on land,
unskilled wages and skilled wages was extracted  from the LSMS. The results of this work is
presented in Table 4 and the details are explained in Appendix D.
A natural question to ask is what percentage of the households are poor, based on the
LSMS. Poverty lines are defined in several ways.  Two well known measures are one dollar per day
per person or two dollars per day per person at a purchasing power parity exchange  rate. Based on
the LSMS data, we calculate that 7.3%  of the population lives on one dollar per day or less, and
17.8% of the population lives on two dollars per day or less. In order to calculate poverty in Brazil,
Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri  [1999]  have developed a measure of poverty that equals  the "minimum
food basket" in the reference  region, metropolitan Sao Paulo, that would generate the FAO
minimum coloric intake  of 2,288 calories per day. They have also developed  indices  that allow them
to define "equivalent" income levels across the individual households in different regions of the
LSMS. We estimate that this measure  (which is the lowest of the three measures Freerira et al.
develop)  amounts to $1.50 per capita per day, using our purchasing power parity adjustments  for
1996.18 Using the poverty headcounts  for each  region in Brazil, reported in Ferreira, Lanjouw and
Neri [1999; Table  3], and sample weights for the individuals in each of the regions of the LSMS in
Brazil, their measure irnplies  a national poverty index of 13.03%  for Brazil using the LSMS.1 9
Based on the Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri [1999]  measure  of poverty incidence, we estimate
that 13% of individuals  in Brazil are below the poverty line. We calculate that 82% of the
18Specifically,  they report an indigence poverty level of 65.07 Reals per month. This is divided by 30.417, the
average number of days in a month, and then divided further by 1.44 to get the PPP-e quivalent in U.S. dollars. This is
$1.48656, which we round to $1.50  for ease of recollection.
19 They also report comparable  numbers from an alternative  survey, known as the PPD, which imply a national
poverty index of 24.7% using comparable  income measures. Ferreira, Lanjouw and Neri [1999; p.131 note some
important differences which could account for the higher poverty index derived from the PPD: unlike the LSMS, it only
asks about one aggregate non-wage  source of income,  using a single question,  despite the considerable heterogeneity  of
non-wage sources  of income. They also note that there may be measurement errors associated with  the way in which the
wage income question is asked, parti cularly  since the same  form of the question is applied to employees of firms and self-
employed individuals.
-13-households in our poorest two, Uhhdl  and Rhidl, fall below this poverty line. Some individuals in
household two or three may be poorer than incividuals in household  1, because they belong to large
families and the groups are defined by household income not per capita income.2 0
Solution Algorithm. The model is  formulatedL using the GAMS-MPSGE  software
developed by Rutherford  [1999]  and solved using the PATH algorithm of Ferris and Munson
[2000].  Although the model has  16 regions  and 22 sectors,  and is large by historical standards, it is
smaller than our Uruguay Round model.  Use o E  demand elasticities  as high as those we employ
could pose numerical problems in general, but this modiel  solved without difficulty. Details on the
software needed to replicate and extend our model are provided in Appendix E.
3. Policy Results
We first discuss how Brazil and all other countries in our miodel will be impacted at the
aggregate level from its various trade policy options. We report the change in welfare  in our model
as  a percent of consumption21 and in 1996 US dollars.  The change in welfare is the "Hicksian
equivalent variation," which in less technical terms can be thought of as the change in real income.
Our aggregate estimate for the change in welfare is the sum of the welfare changes for the twenty
individual households  in our model. We emphasize our central  elasticity results, but also present
results for low elasticities,.  along with results for the imipact on the real exchange  rate and the
percentage change in government revenue  resulting from the tarifi. reductions.  Subsequently, we
present the results of our model of the Brazilian production sectors, with estimates of the imnpact on
prices, output, imports and exports. Finally, we examine the impact of the trade policy options on
the multiple households with a focus on the poor.
20 In subsequent work we intend to investigate  the impact of defining our households  such that the indiiduals
on the first household earn less than one dollar per day, individuals in the second earn between $1 and S1.49, and those
in the third household earn between $1.50 and $1.99. ITis would  allow a more  detailed esimate of poverty impacts
according to different measure.  On the other hand, the model resalts are geneially quite uniform for the poorest
households,  so the main p olicy condusions with res pect to the eff,ect of povertF would not change.
21  Welfare  as a percent of GDP would be abo ut 
7 0% of our esimate of welfare as  a percent of consumption.
2  Systematic sensitivity analysis of the effect of uncertairty about key elastcity estimates on our main  results is
currentlyunderway,  using the methods of Harrison and Vinod [19931  and Harrson,Jones,  Kimbell and  Wigle  [19921.
Those results will be reported later.  Preliminary results indicate  tha t the conclusions we rely on here are qualitatively very
robust.
-14-A. Aggregate  Results  for Brazil and Other Countries
The overall welfare results for the trade policy options of MERCOSUR  are presented in
Table 5A for central elasticities  Oow elasticity results are in Table  5B).  Welfare impacts in these
tables are presented as a percent of personalconsumption  of the respective  country or region.  They
represent changes  on a recurring,  annual basis, so a 1% welfare gain should be interpreted  as a 1%
increase in real income eachyear  in thefuture. In Tables 6A and 6B we present results for the same
scenarios in 1996 US dollars. In Table 7 we present the impact on macroeconomic  variables in Brazil
as a result of these trade policy options.
Free Trade Agreement  of the Americas. In this scenario we assume that all countries in
the Americas agree to offer tariff free access on all products reciprocally, while their external  tariffs
on countries outside of the Americas are not affected by the FTAA. The results  for the FTAA with
central elasticities  are presented in the first column of Table 5A. We estimate that Brazil will gain
from the FTAA by about six-tenths of a percent of Brazilian personal consumption (or from Table
6A, about US $3 billion).
The impact of regional trade arrangements is often discussed using the concepts  of trade
diversion and trade creation.  Regional trade arrangements  can produce negative welfare results on
participating countries, since it is possible that trade is diverted away from more efficient low cost
trading partners who are excluded from the agreement toward imports from members of the free
trade agreement which are not subject to a tariff. This is known as trade diversion. Trade creation
occurs when the partner country is the most efficient  supplier of the product on world markets, so
even though tariffs are lowered only preferentially,  the result is nonetheless an increase in imports
from the most efficient  supplier in the world. When the agreement is with small countries  only, the
lack of competition  among members of the agreement can lead to a significant increase in the cost
of imports  for member countries, i.e., trade diversion. In the case of the FTAA, the agreement
includes a very large economic area. For most products, there are suppliers within the Americas who
are either the most efficient supplier of the product on world markets  or else they are close to the
most efficient supplier.  Moreover,  competition among the many countries and suppliers prevents
the supply price for imports from partner countries from rising significantly.
For these reasons, we estimate that Brazil and most countries in the Americas will gain from
a FTAA. The one exception to this pattem in the Americas is Argentina, which we estimate to lose
-15-slightly from the FTAA. The reason Argentina is estimated to lose from the FTAA is that prior to
the FTAA, it enjoys preferential  access  to the mnarkets of the other MERCOSUR  countries. The
FIAA provides  equivalent access  to the other countries in the Americas  to the MERCOSUR
markets, thereby eroding the preferential  access of Argentina.  The loss of preferential access for
Argentina, combined with trade diversion effects, are larger than the trade  creation effects.
On the other hand,  countries that are excluded from the agreement (the EU, Japan and Rest
of the World)  all lose as a result of the FTAA. Their combined loss is $8.4 billion. The reason is that
the excluded countries suffer a decline in demand for their exports to the Americas as importers in
the Americas shift demand toward suppliers  from the Almericas.  Ihe EU is estimated to lose  $2.6
billion,  slightly more than the $2.3 billion the United States is estimated  to gain.
From Table  7 we see that the estimated loss  of tariff revenue is about six-tenths  of one
percent of GDP. This is over half of the tariff revenue  available in  the benchmark  equilibrium The
Brazilian authorities  will have to be cognizant of the need to replace the tariff revenue with alternate
taxes  so as not to contribute  to the fiscal deficit. We estimate that the real exchange  rate will
depredate as  a result of the FTAA by about 2.6%, In general, the reduction in home country
(MERCOSUR)  tariffs leads to an increase in the demand for impcrts. The real exchange rate in
MERCOSUR countries  has to depreciate to restore equilibrium in  the balance of trade. A real
depreciation results in an increase in the supply of foreign exchange from exports  and a decrease the
demand for foreign exchange from imports, wnich together restore  equilibrium in the balance of
trade. Mitigating against the real exchange  rate depreciation  is the irnproved access  or terms of trade
improvement in the markets of partner countries. Improved terms of trade in partner markets
results in an increase in the supply of foreign exchange  and induces an appreciation in the real
exchange rate. On balance, the tariff reduction dominat-es  our assessment of the impact on the real
exchange rate.
European Union-MERCOSUR agreement.  In this scenario we assume that
MERCOSUR  and the EU agree to offer tariff free access  to all thzir markets  reciprocally. In colurnn
3 of Tables  5A and 6A we present our central elasticity estimates  of the irnpact of a free trade
agreement between MERCOSUR and the EU, in percent of cons amption and US dollars,
respectively (ow  elasticity estimates  are in Tables  5B and 6B).
-16-The gains to Brazil from a MERCOSUR  agreement with the EU are about 1.5 times the
gains from a FTAA. The gains to Argentina and Uruguay are dramatically larger than with the
FTAA. The reason for this can be seen from Table 3: the EU has several agricultural and food
products with very high tariffs. If Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay could obtain tariff free  access  to
these EU markets, while the EU continues to apply these tariffs on other countries,  they would
obtain a very large terms  of trade gain in EU markets. In the case of the relatively small economy of
Uruguay, the large increase in prices available in the EU induces a large  shift of exports toward the
EU to take advantage of the increase in prices.
As with the FTAA, countries  excluded from the agreement typically lose due to the shift in
demand toward partner country suppliers.  One exception is Japan. As the EU and MERCOSUR
countries shift toward  the markets of each other, Japan obtains  a small terms of trade improvement
in the markets of the Rest of the World. The gains to Japan, however, are very small, and round to
zero at the nearest one-tenth of a percent ofJapan's consumption.
Excluded Products in the EU-MERCOSUR  Agreement.  Some would argue that
MERCOSUR will have great difficulty negotiating  an agreement with the EU in which the EU
would grant tariff free access in its highly protected  agricultural products. The EU has steadfastly
refused to do so in its Association Agreements  with the Central and Eastern European countries, in
its customs union agreement with Turkey, and in its free trade area agreements with various
Mediterranean countries  such as Morocco and Tunisia.  Hence it is unlikely to offer concessions to
MERCOSUR that it has refused to offer to other countries  for which it might be viewed as having
more to gain geo-politically. What is the cost to Brazil of denial of full market access in a
MERCOSUR-EU  agreement? In this scenario we assume that the EU fails to provide improved
market access  to its highly protected products. These products and the tariff rates in the EU in our
data set are:  paddy rice  (65%), cereal  grains (44%),  processed rice (86%),  other food products
(28%),  bovine meat products  (95%), dairy products  (90%), other meat products  (61%) and sugar
(76%).
The central elasticity results are presented in Tables  5A and 6A. For Brazil we see that if the
EU fails to provide full market access,  the value of the EU-MERCOSUR  agreement is reduced to
one-tenth of a percent of consumption from nine-tenths of a percent, i.e.,  the agreement  contains
very little value. The estimated gains for Uruguay are reduced dramatically. The highly protected
-17-agriculture and food product markets in the EU are prodacts in which the MERCOSUR countries
have a comparaive advantage. Consequently,  if the free trade agreement between the EU and
MERCOSUR excludes these products, the expected benefits would  be significantly reduced. These
results demonstrate the importance of improved access  In preferential trade agreements, emphasized
by Wonnacott and Wonnacott  [1981]. In addition, the gains to the EU are reduced from 0.5% of its
consumption to 0.1%, reflecting the importance of agriculture liberalization in the EU for the EU to
reap gains.
Excluded Products in the FTAA (by the United States against Brazil).  There is also a
potential for excluded products in the FTAA, although  the exclusion is likely to be implicit rather
than explicit. Despite a proposal by Chile to limit the use of antidumnping actions as part of the
FTAA, the US has heretofore strongly resisted efforts to limit the utse of antidurnping actions as part
of the FTAA.  In addition, the Brazilian authorities have  expressed  the fear that the benefits of
improved access  to the markets of the US will be denied  by antidwnping actions. In this scenario we
provide an estimate of the costs to Brazil of continued US protection of its most protected markers
even if a FTAA is implemented. We focus on the most highly protected products in the US market:
oil seeds (18%), other crops  (14%),2  dairy products (42%) and sugar (53%). In this scenario  we
assume that on the most sensitive and highly protected products in the US, the US employs
antidumping duties to neutralize the impact of the FTAA on the exports of  Brazil. That is, the US
tariff applied on exports  from Brazil of these products  dloes not change in the counterfactual when
we implement the FTAA with excluded products in the US. This is. not a full treatment of the
potential use of antidumping within the FTAA or of the impact on Brazil.  Such a treatment would
have to account for antidumping duties by the US against other partners in the Americas as well, and
the use of antidumping by countries other than the US. Moreover,  antidumping in sectors  such as
steel, limits access  for Brazilian exports relative to the MFN tariff tates we employ. But this scenario
should provide an assessment of the potential  costs to Brazil of US  mntidumping.
23  Our category other crops is an agregate of th e following sectors from the full GTAP dataset wheat,
vegetables and fruits, fiber based plants, wool, forestry, fishing and the category  dther crops. We have also performed
simulations with wheat as part of grains rather than other crops. Argentina gains more from the EU-MERCOSUR
agreement, but otherwise most of the results change by extremely saill amounts.
-18-The impact of excluded products in the US is to reduce the benefits  to Brazil to about two-
thirds of the gains Brazil would receive with full market access in a FTAA. The reduction in benefits
from denied market access in the US is not as severe as the impact of exduded products with the
EU agreement. There are two principal reasons why denial of market access is more important in the
agreement with the EU. First, the tariff peaks in the United  States market are not as high as the tariff
peaks in the EU. The large impacts tend to be driven by the tariff peaks, so the impact of excduding
the tariff peak products in the EU is very large.  Second,  there are other markets in the Americas
that open up to Brazil as part of  the FTAA. If the US fails to provide preferential access to its
highly protected products,  Brazil may sell these products in the other markets of the Americas since,
in the FTAA, Brazil obtains preferential access  to these markets compared to countries outside the
Americas. On the other hand, if the EU denies preferential  access as part of a free trade agreement
between  Brazil and the EU, there are no alternate  markets in which Brazil has preferential access for
these products as part of the agreement.
Combining the Free Trade Agreement  of the Americas with the MERCOSUR-EU
Agreement.  Some authorities  in Brazil have expressed a desire for an agreement with the EU to
come into effect together with the FTAA. Our results, in Tables  5A, 5B, 6A and 6B, indicate that
the benefits to Brazil from the two agreements  together exceed the sum of the benefits for each of
the agreements  separately. This is because the combined  economic area-of the Americas plus the EU
is rather vast, and Brazil is more likely to find the most efficient world supplier in this combined
economic area than in either region separately.  That is, the trade diversion effects  that are part of
either agreement separately are reduced by combining the two agreements.  Thus, the strategy of
negotiating an agreement with the EU in addition to the FTAA appears to be a useful strategy that is
likely to increase the welfare gains to Brazil.24
Unilateral Trade Liberalization by 50 Percent. We estimate that a 50% cut in the tariffs
of MERCOSUR will result in an increase in welfare by about four-tenths of a percent of Brazilian
consumption, or about $1.9 billion per year. Thus, the gains from the FTAA with exduded access to
24 These results are similar to the results Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [2002]  found  for Chile when they found
that the "additive  regionalism" strategy of Chile resulted in significantly larger benefits  than the agreements taken
separately.
-19-the US market on selected products results in approximately the  samne gains as a unilateral tariff cut
by MERCOSUR of 50%.
Multilateral Trade Liberalization.  Brazilian  authorities have also encouraged multilateral
trade negotiations, and supported the Doha Development Agenda. In part, this is due to the view
that the most likely venue in which agricultural  liberalization  (which is important to Brazil) will take
place is through the World Trade Organization.  We  consider a scenario in which all countries in the
world reduce their tariffs and export subsidies  and taxes by 50%.
Brazil gains about eight tenths  of a percent of personal  consumption from multilateral trade
liberalization in our static model, or about $4.5  billion.  TIhis is larger than the gains from the FTAA
and larger than the gains from an agreement with the EU that excludes the highly protected
agricultural and food products. Given the likely exclusion of agriculture  from a MERCOSUR
agreement with the EU, these results support the strategy of the Brazilian  authorities  that it is
important to pursue multilateral liberalization  together with the regional options. In fact, it is most
important.
FTAA with no change in the external tariffs of MERCODSUR.  We can also evaluate the
impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas in which no improved access to the markets of
MERCOSUR is offered. That is, in this  scenario we assuime that the countries in the Americas
outside of MERCOSUR lower their tariffs prefzrentially  to all countries in the Americas  (so Brazil
obtains improved market access),  but the countries  in iMERCOSUR  do not lower MERCOSUR
tariffs against the partner countries in the Ameticas  (so 'Brazil does not offer any improved market
access). The purpose of this scenario is to assess how much of the gains to Brazil will come from
improved  market access to the markets of the Americas  and how rmuch is due to lowering the tariffs
of MERCOSUR,  thereby achieving improved resource allocation in Brazil.  One could imagine active
use of antidumping policy in Brazil and Argentina that clenies improved access to the countries of
the Americas. This is analogous  to our scenario above  in which we assumed the FTAA was
implemented but the United States failed to provide impiroved matket access  to Brazil through the
use of antidumping.
In column (8) of table 5A we see that tl-e gains to Brazil are reduced  to 0.4 percent of
consumption, i.e., about two-thirds of the gains remain.. This  shows that improved  market access in
-20-responsible  for about two-thirds of the gains to Brazil  from the FTAA; the remaining  one-third of
the gains comes from the lowering of the MERCOSUR tariff preferentially.  From Tables  8A and
9A, however, we see that the gains to the poorest households  are reduced much more dramatically.
That is, poor households gain much more from the reduction in MERCOSUR  tariffs in the FTAA
than from improved market access. We explain why below.
Impact on Partner and Excluded Countries-Comparison  with Multilateral
Liberalization.  Experience with regional trade arrangements  has shown that if the agreement is not
mutually beneficial to all parties, then it is unlikely to be effectively implemented  or sustained (World
Bank [2000]).  Agreements may exist defaco, but are not implemented  effectively. Thus the impact of
the FTAA or EU-MERCOSUR on Brazil's partner countries in the trade agrcements  is relevant to
the likely success of the agreements in the long run, Moreover,  even if the agreements are beneficial
to Brazil and its partners, if the benefits are derived from losses to countries  that are excluded from
the agreements, then clearly the agreements would be unattractive  from the perspective of the
multilateral trading system.  Thus, it is important to estimate the impact  on partner and excluded
countries as well. We compare the results to multilateral trade liberalization of 50%  tariff and export
subsidy cuts. In order to be able to compare gains and losses across countries, in Table  6A and 6B
we  add the dollar estimates across countries to arrive at a sum for countries  included in the
agreement or a sum for those excluded from the agreements.
All the agreements  considered  result in net benefits  for virtually all the included  countries.25
These agreements  are roughly all trade creating agreements. This  reflects the fact that all the
agreements  create large  economic areas, where it may be expected  that competition prevails  for most
products and the most efficient  suppliers are likely to be close  to the most efficient in the world.
Regarding  excluded countries, virtually all excluded countries lose from regional agreements
(the impact on Japan of EU-MERCOSUR is an exception for the reasons mentioned  above).26 The
agreements are sufficiently trade creating, however,  that these agreements generate gains to the
world as a whole. For the world as a whole, we estimate that multilateral liberalization  generates
25 Argentina loses slightly from the FTAA  in our central elasticity  case dur to the erosion of preferential  access
in the MERCOSUR markets. Using the GTAP dataset and modeling softwarc, Cardoso Teixera  [2002]  and Lia Valls
Pereira [1999]  also found that Argentina loses and Brazil gains from the FTAA
26 Losses  appear for most countries reported to have zero welfare  change whcn the  data are reported  to an
additional decimal place.
-21-gains to the world of more than four times the gains from the best of the regional arrangements we
consider.  This emphasizes the importance to the world trading community of multilateral
negotiations.
B. Impact on Production Sectors: Changes in Output, Price, Imports and Exports
In Tables 1  OA (and  1  OB for low elasticities) we present the estimates of the impacts on
production sectors as a results of the trade policy options. The percentage change in output, exports,
imports and the consumer price in Brazil are presented. Although f ae impact on the sectors depends
on the specific agreement,  there is a pattern.  In general, the oil seeds, other agriculture (excluding
grains and wheat), other crops (which includes fruits and vegetables, and wheat), processed food and
leather sectors expand production and exports, while several manufacturing sectors, induding motor
vehides, other metal products  and the sector we call manufacturing, decline. This reflects relative
protection in Brazil, which favors manufacturing  at the expense of agriculture and processed food
products. When protection is reduced in the economy, resources slift toward the agriculture and
food sectors that had been disadvantaged  relativ-e to manufacturing.  We also note that the expanding
sectors tend to be less capital intensive than the contracting sectors, and this has implications for the
impact on the poor.
The reduction in tariffs generally depreciates the real exchange rate  (see Table 7 for
estimates); this is because the increased demand for imports accompanying the decline in tariffs
induces and increase in the price of foreign  exchange. The depreciation of  the real  exchange rate encourages
exports and mutes the import expansion.  The deprecated real  exchange rate  results in the export sectors baving
an increased  incentive to export even if the tanffs in the export markets are unchanged.  This is one of the primary
reasons that international  trade economists  say that an import tarifl is equivalent to a tax on exports.
Given our view that Brazil will neither give nor receive 2 "free lunch" from the rest of the world in
the long run, we assume that there must be an increase in the value of exports to match the increase
in the value of imports  accompanying tariff reduction. Ille real exchange rate is the principal
variable that induces the equilibrium between the change in imports and exports.
At the sector level, we see that the export expansion is rather broad in the FTAA and the
multilateral and unilateral scenarios. The biggest export empansion  comes from the sectors that are
expanding production, namely the sectors that received relatively lirtle protection initially. The
combined export expansion from the sectors  expanding exports mast offset the increased in imports
-22-plus the decline in exports from the few manufacturing sectors that contract exports. Since (from
Table 2) we see that the manufacturing  sector was the most export intensive sector in Brazil among
the sectors of our model  (at 29% of the value of domestic output); and manufacturing has the
highest value of initial exports, the export expansion in other sectors must be more substantial.
Different agreements have disparate impacts on different sectors. The EU-MERCOSUR
agreement could induce an enormous  percentage increase in agriculture  and food exports.  Exports
of the products highly protected in the EU are estimated to expand from 63%  (grains) to several
multiples of the current level of exports in the case of bovine meat products. However, if the EU
excludes the highly protected agriculture  and food products  from the agreement then the expansion
of exports of these products would be very modest.
In Table  10B, the results  for the low elasticity scenario is presented. In general, as expected
from economic theory, the impact on the sectors is muted with lower elasticities.
Multilateral trade liberalization is also estimated to have a positive impact on agriculture and
food exports,  and has a strong impact on reducing agriculture and food imports. The reduction in
imports of these products is explained by the fact we assume that export subsidies (mostly relevant
in the EU) are also reduced by 50% with multilateral trade liberalization.
The FTAA is estimated to lead to a substantial  expansion of the leather sector, but also of
the sugar sector. Exports of these products plus oil seeds and "other crops" expand significantly
with the FTAA even if we assume that the US excludes Brazilian access  to its most highly protected
markets.27
C. Impact on Households  and the Poor
Although we have seen that the trade policy changes under consideration are generally
beneficial for the Brazilian  economy as a whole, in this section we present our estimates and
explanations  of the impact of the trade policy changes on the different households in Brazil. We
focus especially on the impact on poor households.
In our model we have twenty households in Brazil: ten rural and ten urban, grouped
according to income. In Tables 8A and 8B we present the results on the households in percentage
terms and in Tables  9A and 9B we present the impacts in terms of US dollars. Consider the FTAA
27Burfisher et a 1. [2002]  found only small increases in agicultural  imports in the US as a result of the FIAA.
-23-as an example.  With central elasticities, we can see from Table 8A that while the overall impact is an
increase in Brazilian welfare by six-tenths of a percent of consumption,  the impact on the poorest
rural and urban household is an increase in welfare by about four times this amount: that is, an
increase of 2.5 percent of the value of household consumription.  For the basic seven scenarios
considered in Tables  8A and 8B, we estimate  thaLt the poorest household wiLL typically gain several
multiples of the aggregate gains for the economy  expressed as a percent of household consumption.
Although the impact on the income of households  is not stuictly progressive, the four
poorest urban households and four poorest rural households  are among the biggest gainers from the
reforms as  a percent of their own household consumption.2"  The reason for this result, as shown in
Table 4, is that the poorest households  eam the majority of their inicome from unskilled labor and
the wage rate of unskilled labor increases  significantly more that the  skilled labor wage rate and the
rent on capital (see Table 7).  The poor typicaLLy do not have significant real assets or financial assets
accumulated so they do not eam significant capital income or income from the rent of land. Nor do
the poor typically have much human capital accumulated,  so they earn a much smaller share of their
income from skilled labor that the middle incorre classes. Although  these facts are intuitive, they are
documented in Appendix D based on the Brazilian LSMS.
The value of land rises even more than the wage rate of unskilled labor. As a result of their
land ownership, two of the richest rural households  are the biggest gainers from the reforms.
To document this interpretation, we decompose the impact of the FTAA on households  and
present the results in Table 11. In column (1) we reproduce the base results  from Table 8A for the
FTAA. In column  (2) we counterfactuaLLy  assume that all households  consume the commodities in
the same proportions. We observe that while the gains to the poorest households  are slightly
reduced compared  to the total for the economy, the percentage gains in household  income of the
poorest households remain between three to four times  dhe percentage gains for  aLL households
together.  Thus, disparate consumption shares do not explain why the poor households gain more
from the trade policy changes.  On the other harnd,  in column  (3) we present the results of our FTAA
28 The Gini coe fficient does improve with the main policy scenarios we are considering. For example, it changes
from 0.5850 in our benchmark to 0.5826 in scenario FTAA.  For reasDns explained in Harrison,  Rutherford and Tarr
(2001], however, we caution against use of simple measures  of  inequality such as the Gini when the concern is really with
the impact on the poor. It is quite possible, as illustrated there,  for the Gini to indicate an improvement in the
distribution of welfare (an improvement being defined as a more egiatarian distribution)  while poverty increases. There
are ways to modify the Gini to give greater weight to the poor, but we prefer to utilize  the detailed results  from the
simulations directly rather than debate the virtues of alternative  sumrnnary  statistic s.
-24-scenario where we counterfactually assume that all households  earn their income from the factors of
production in the same proportions. That is, we ignore the data  in Table 4 from the LSMS as to
how the different households  earn their income. Instead we assume that all households  earn the
same share of their income from the wages of unskilled labor, wages of skilled labor, rent on capital,
and rent on land.  We see in column (3) that most of the poorest households would only obtain a
slightly greater increase in income compared to the average of six-tenths of a percent if they earned
their income in the same manner as the average for the economy as a whole. This confirms that
what is critical for explaining why poor households  are estimated to gain more from the trade policy
options is that the price of the factors of production important to the income of the poor
households rise more than proportionately.  From Table 4 we see that the factor most important to
the poor is the wage rate of unskilled labor. Data in Table 7 show that the unskilled labor wage rate
rises the fastest among the important household income factors.
Why do we estimate that the wage rate of unskilled labor rises the fastest among the factors
of production  (except for land)? International  trade theory argues that, following trade liberalization,
the price of the factor of production used intensively in the protected  sector should  fall relative  to
the price of the factor of production in the unprotected  sector.29 In countries where unskilled labor
is relatively abundant  (as in most developing countries), the country has a comparative  advantage in
the goods that use unskilled labor intensively,  and these countries often protect the capital intensive
sectors which can't compete in open competition on world markets. Trade liberalization would
therefore move resources from the capital intensive sectors to the unskilled labor intensive  sectors,
and would be expected  to increase the wage rate of unskilled labor.  This is precisely what happens
in our trade policy scenarios for Brazil. Sectors such as motor vehicles,  other metal products, and
other manufacturing, which are among the most capital intensive  sectors in Brazil, are the sectors
that decline. On the other hand, it is the key agriculture  sectors  that, due to export expansion, are
expanding output. And these sectors are the most intensive in unskilled labor in our data.
To further verify this explanation, we perform  one additional simulation in column  (4) of
Table  11. As explained in appendix C, input-output tables notoriously provide inaccurate
information about factor shares.30 In particular,  the capital intensity estimates  for agriculture  are
29 This is known as the Stolper-Samuelson  theorem.
30 Researchers  at the International  Food Research Institute  such as Arndt et al [1998],  Thomas and Bautista
[1999]  and Hausner [1999]  have noted this problem.
-25-often strongly biased upward. Thus, we estimated factor shares  frorn additional information riot in
the Brazilian input-output table and presented those estimates in Table 2. In column  (4) of Table  11
we present the estimated percentage welfare gains from tle FTAA  :o Brazilian households if we use
the biased factor shares  available in the original GI'AP data. The results show that if we use tihe
uncorrected factor shares in the GTAP dataset, there is a dramatic difference in the results. The
poorest rural (urban) household  is estimated to gain five-tenths  (four-tenths) of a percent of its
consumpion, equal or slightly less than the aggregate average percentage gain.  This shows that the
corrections we performed  to the factor share data are crucial to the results  at the level of the
household and supports the interpretation that the shift of resources  toward agriculture is important
in increasing the incomes  of the poor and reducing poverty.
Our results  also show (in column (8) of Tables  5, 6,  8 and 9)  that internal resource
reallocation is relatively more important to the poor than improved  market access.  As explained
above, in this  scenario, MERCOSUR does not change its own tariffs but obtains improved market
access  to the markets of the Americas.  The gains to the economy on average fall by about one-third
compared to the FTAA, but the gains to the poorest households  fall by two-thirds. This is because it
is internal resource reallocation that increases  the unskilled wages rzlative to other factor prices, not
improved market access.  With only improved market access,  the poor gain, but not progressively  as
they do with internal liberalization in MERCOSUR.
Although we find that the reforms  are significantly pro-poor, our model implicitly assumes a
time long enough  to re-establish equilibrium after some policy shock. Thus, it is possible that during
the transition to a new equilibrium some poor householdLs  will be hurt. This is especially likely
among the households that are moving out of the decliring sector.,  such as the more highly
protected manufacturing  sectors. This  emphasizes  the need to have an effective  safety net in place to
assist the poor.
At a methodological level, these decompositions of the source of changes in welfare across
households represent  a general equilibrium analogue, and extension, of the type of factor
decompositions of the source of inequality proposed  by Shorrocks  [1982]. His decompositions
allowed an exact identification of the contribution from each of thefactor  components  offactor
income, assuming that those factor components  added ap to factor income for each of the units oF
analysis. Our approach  considers the (aggregate)  factor-income  con-tribution  to welfare  changes as
well as the expenditure-pattern contribution.
-26-4. Opdmizing Brazilian Trade Policy
In this section we assume that the most likely outcome of negotiations  with the EU is that
the EU will exclude  the highly protected agricultural products from the agreement with
MERCOSUR,  and that the United States will continue to apply antidumping actions against nations
in the Americas,  even with a FTAA. Given that these agreements  are likely to have what we refer to
as "excluded products," how can Brazil combine  various policies to optimize its trade policy, or
more precisely optimize the trade policy of MERCOSUR?  In Table  12 we present five scenarios
that represent combinations of policies  to evaluate the impacts.
FTAA with excluded products in the US  and 50% unilateral MERCOSUR tariff cuts.
In column  (1) we evaluate the impact of MERCOSUR unilaterally lowering its tariffs by 50%  across
the board in combination with the FTAA with excluded products in the US. In our analysis,  excluded
products in the US means that US antidumping policy denies access to Brazilian exports in the
highly protected products in the US of oil seeds, other crops, dairy products and sugar.  The
estimated gains to Brazil are 0.72% of Brazilian consumption.  Compare this outcome to column (2)
of Table 5A, where Brazil gains only four-tenths of a percent of Brazilian  consumption with the
FTAA and excluded products. By unilaterally lowering the common external tariff of MERCOSUR,
Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina reduce the trade diversion costs of the FTAA, while retaining
preferred access  to the markets of the Americas. In addition, there are improved  resources allocation
effects from the lowering of the tariff in MERCOSUR, independent  of the regional impacts. Thus,
the gains for all three countries from an FTAA with exduded products in the United States would
increase with a 50% across the board cut in tariffs unilaterally.  In the case of Argentina,  the welfare
effects go from being negative to being positive  (not shown in the Table).
Combining the Free Trade Agreement  of the Americas with the MERCOSUR-EU
Agreement with Excluded Products.  A combination of the FTAA and the MERCOSUR
agreement with the EU may be subject to the exclusions of agriculture  and food products for the
EU and the antidumping neutralization in the FTAA for the reasons discussed in Section 3. Thus,
we also estimate the welfare impact on Brazil and other countries of the combined effect of these
agreements with the same exclusions discussed above for the agreements  separately. The impact on
Brazil is that the gains from the combined agreements with excluded products (0.85%  of
-27-consumption)  exceeds the sAn of the gains  froni the separate  agreements  with exclusions  (0.5%  of
consumption).  The reason  a gain is  that the combirned agreements  teduce the trade diversion impacts
of either of the agreements  s  eparately.
FTAA plus EU-MEv  RCOSUR  (both with excluded products) and 50% MERCOSUR,
tariff cuts.  In column  (3) of Table 12 we present the results for a combination  of the FTAA and a
MERCOSUR agreement wiih the EU (with excLucled products in both regional arrangements)  plus a
unilateral  50%  tariff cut by MERCOSUR.  The zstimated  gains to Brazil are 0.97 percent of Brazilian
consumption.  Comparing columns  (2) and  (3), the additional gains from unilateral  liberalization
derive from both reducing trade diversion of the preferential arrangements and improved resource
allocation from moving closer to world prices of impor:s.
FTAA plus EU-MERCOSUR  (both with excluded  prciducts) combined with 50%
Multilateral Trade reform in goods.  In colurnn (4)  of Table  12 we present the results of the
combination of the regional agreements  and a multilateral  agreemcnt. We assume  that the EU-
MERCOSUR agreement excluded  the highly protected agricultural products, but that they are
included in the multilateral  agreement.  This is the strategy some of  the leaders in Brazil have
advocated - pursue regional trade  agreements while at the same time pursuing multilateral  trade
liberalization,  since it is  pres imed that only multilateral negotiatioins  wilL succeed in achieving
agricultural tariff reduction  and export subsidy reduction. Given the onset of the Doha
Development Agenda, we examine the impact of a 50%/o  multilateral tariff cut in all regions
(including MERCOSUR)  while MERCOSUR  olso participates  in the FTAA and a free trade
agreement with the EU  (Wit-  excluded products).  Analytically,  this scenario  is similar to the previous
one except that the all countries in the world lower their tariff by 50%, not just MERCOSUR.  In
this scenario  MERCOSUR countries obtain improved access to t  e markets  of the rest of the world
and Japan (compared the scenario  of a regional  arrangement with  the EU and the FTAA), but the
preferred access  that MERCOSUR negotiates  in these regional arrangements  is eroded by the
multiLateral  liberalization.  Tihus, there are offsetting effects from  multilateraL liberalization to the
MERCOSUR  countries, given regional  arrangements  in.  place, but on balance multilateral
liberalization produces  gains for MIERCOSUR  countries. We find that Brazil will gain 1.14 percent
of its personal consumption  in aggregate.  Compared with the results of column (3), which includes
-28-unilateral liberalization  in MERCOSUR,  the gains  are due to additional market access  to the rest of
the world and Japan, along with liberalization in the US and the EU of products excluded in the
regional arrangements.
The four poorest rural households  and the four poorest urban households all gain
substantially more as a percent of their personal consumption.  This is because, as explained in
Section 3, the sectors that use unskilled labor intensively  expand relative to the other sectors, driving
up the wage of unskilled labor relative to the prices of other factors of production.  Since the poor
depend more on the wage of unskilled labor, their incomes rise several times faster than the average.
Tariff Uniformity.  In column  (5) of Table 12 we show estimates of the impact of
MERCOSUR  moving to a uniform tariff. That is, we impose a uniform tariff in MERCOSUR and
allow the rate to adjust such that collected revenue  from the tariff in Brazil is unchanged. We find
that the uniform tariff rate is able to fall to seven percent.
The results from this scenario indicate  that a movement to a uniform tariff in MERCOSUR
would convey significant benefits  to Brazil of 0.66% of personal consumption. In fact, the gains are
larger than the gains to Brazil from a 50% unilateral across  the board tariff cut. The reason tariff
uniformity conveys benefits is that distortion costs of a tariff regime rise more than proportionately
with the tariff.  Thus, the largest gains derive from chopping off the tariff peaks.
These results are consistent with our earlier results  (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1993]
[20021) in which we have shown that a movement toward uniformity will convey a significant share
of the benefits of moving to free trade when tariffs are diverse. In addition, Martinez  de Prera [2000]
evaluated  the consequences  of moving to uniform tariffs from the actual tariff structures in CGE
models of 13 separate  countries. She found that there would be welfare gains from tariff uniformity
in all  13 countries.  Evidently, tariffs do not typically differ from uniformity in these economies due
to efficiency of taxation reasons.3' On the contrary, the large gains from trade liberalization  are
typically derived from reducing tariff peaks, which is effectively accomplished with tariff uniformity.
Reducing low tariffs results in proportionately  smaller gains, and may even result in losses if the
31 The set of elasticities  we have chosen, however, makes unifornity  beneficial in general.  That is, the Ramsey
optimal taxation rule suggests  that higher taxes should be placed  on the goods  with the lower elasticity of demand. With
our virtually homogeneous  choice of elasticities, the Ramsey  opimal  tariffs  are close  to uniform.
-29-importing country possesses  monopsony power.32 Thus, we find that tariff uniformity in
MERCOSUR can convey significant benefits to Brazil
In addition, we see ihat tariff uniformity is slightly progressive as well. The four poorest
households gain more wher  measured  as a percent of their own household consumption.
FTAA plus EU-MERCOSUR (with excludecd products) combined with 50%
Multilateral Trade reform in goods combined with tariff unif;rnmity in MERCOSUR. In the
sixth column of Table  12 we present estimates of the impact of ptrsuing all avenues - regional,
multilateral and unilateral  (where the unilateral action in uniformity). That is, we evaluate the
combined impact of a FTAA (with US excJusions), plus an agreemrient between the EU and
MERCOSUR (with  excluded agricultural produicts), plus an across-  the-board multilateral trade
liberalization  (in tariffs and export subsidies), plus tariff uniformitv  in MERCOSUR.  This scenario
adds tariff uniformity to the grand strategy scenario  evaluated in column (4) of Table 12.
The gains from this scenario  are, as expected, the largest of the options considered.
Comparing columns (4) and (6), we see that adding tariFf uniformity adds about 0.21  of a percent to
the overall welfare gain to the economy. The gains from adding uniformity are less than when we
consider uniformity  alone. Uniformity  achieves  benefits from chopping off the tariff peaks, and the
benefits increase geometrically with the height of the tariff.  Since the regional and multilateral
policies reduce the tariff peaks  significantly,  there are less gains frcm uniformity.  Nonetheless, this
combined scenario produces the largest aggregate gains  For Brazil.
32MERCOSUR may  have a low optimal tariff despite being small on world markets for most products. If
Brazilian exports are differentiated  from the products of other countries  so that Brazil in aggregate  face s a downward
sloping demand curve for a product, even if individual Brazilian producers  do not perceive a downward  sloping demand
curve, then there will be an optimal export tax to maximize Brazilin  export profits. The height of the optimal  export tax
will be inversely related to the elasticity of demand faced by Brazil in its export markets, which is in turn determined by
how substitutable Brazil's products  are with those of other countdrs.  In the limit, when Brazilian  products are perfect
substitutes in all its export markets for  products from all other countries, Brazil has no ability to obtain a higher price by
restricting its exports. In this case the optimal export tax is zero.
Although Brazil imposes virtually no export  taxes, the Lemer symmetly theorem tells us that in general
equilibrium import tariffs  are equivalent to export taxes.  The import tariff will  ax all export sectors roughly uniformly.
However, with product differentiation  and many sectors, market power on exports differs across sectors and destination
markets.  Hence the import tariff is not as efficient an instrument as export taxes varying by sector and destination.
Nonetheless, if export taxes are ruled out, there is a posilive optimal import  tariff.
In our central elasticity scenarios  we have assurned  that all countdes have an elasticity of substitution between
imports from different countries (uL? equal to 30. We  s]how in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr  [1997b; Appendix  C]  that
the optimal tariff e is bounded below by t*= {[o^/(Q,,.l)]  - 1}.  Ihus, even with aoM = 30, the optimal  tariff is over 3%;
but in our low elasticity  scenarios, with 0oZ  = 8, the optimal tariff is over 14%.  Given the existence  of an average import
tariff for MERCOSUR of 12 %, the optimum tariff is lower than the existing tariff in our central  elasticity scenarios.
-30-5. Systematic  Sensitivity Analysis
Since elasticity estimates are subject to a margin of error, our "remedy" for this problem,
which is endemic to any large-scale model of this kind, is to undertake  systematic sensitivity analyses
of our major results with respect to plausible bounds on these elasticities.  Essentially these
procedures  amount to a Monte Carlo simulation exercise in which a wide range of elastidties are
independently and simultaneously perturbed from their benchmark values following prescribed
probability distributions. The results of simulating the impact of the FTAA 500 times were
tabulated as a distribution, with equal weight being given (by construction)  to each Monte Carlo run.
The upshot is a probability distribution defined over the endogenous variables of interest. In our
case we focus solely on the welfare impacts  of the full FTAA scenario.
Based on the distribution of results, we find there is virtually no chance that Brazil will gain
less than 0.3 percent of the value of its consumption  from the FTAA.  We find that the FTAA
members will gain at least $12 billion per year with virtual certainty, and excluded countries will lose
at least $6.7 billion US dollars from the FTAA with virtual certainty. The European Union will lose
around $3 billion per year with virtual certainty.  Global welfare will increase by more than $3 billion
per year with virtual certainty.  The sensitivity results confirm the condusions  drawn from the point
estimates regarding who the gainers and losers  are at the aggregate country level.
Our results suggest that the poorest urban and rural households will gain more than one
percent of the value of their consumption with probability close to one. In general, our point
estimates are robust with respect to the probability distributions we have assumed.
6. Conclusions
Our results suggest that the regional arrangements  under consideration by MERCOSUR, the
FTAA and an agreement with the EU, can both be expected to result in gains to Brazil. The
agreement with the EU is about 1.5 times  as valuable as the FTAA due to access to highly protected
agricultural markets  in the EU. The combined gains from both agreements  will be greater than the
gains obtained from the sum of the agreements  separately due to a reduction of trade diversion. The
big countries in these agreements, however,  may exclude their most protected products from the
agreements. In that case, the FTAA will be more valuable to Brazil than the agreement with the EU.
-31-We find that tariff uniformity also yields benefts for BraziL.  Unilateral application of
uniform tariffs in MERCOSUR,  such that collected tar.ff revenue in Brazil is unchanged, would
yield benefits  even larger than a unilateral  50% tariff cut in MERCOSUR.
Most of the trade policy options we evaluate, eidter  regional,  multilateral or unilateral, result
in a distribution  of the gains to the different households  that is progressive,  such that the poorest
households  experience  the greatest percentage increase in their incomes. This is because the trade
policy changes tend to shift resources from capital intensive  manufacturing toward unskiULed  labor
intensive agriculture,  thereby inducing an increase in the wage of LLnskiULed labor relative to the other
prices of factors of production. This is turn results in a percentage  increase in the incomes of the
poorest households in Brazil relative to the richest.  The percentage  increase in the incomes of the
poorest households is three to four times greater than the percentage  increase in the income of the
average for the economy as a whole.
Our estimates indicate that the apparent Brazilian  strategy of simultaneously pursuing a
MERCOSUR agreement with the EU plus the FTAA, while supporting multilateral trade
liberalization  at the WTO, is well considered.  Brazil can optimize its choice  of trade policies by
combining regional arrangements in both the Americas  and the E-J with multilateral liberalization.  If
tariff uniformity is added to the regional and multilateral liberalization,  stiUL further gains would be
realized.
Both the FTAA and the EU-MERCOSUR  arrangements are net trade-creating  for the
countries involved, but excLuded countries almost always lose frorn the agreements. Multilateral
trade liberalization results in gains to the world  more tlLan four times greater than either of these
relatively beneficial regional arrangements,  showing the importance  to the world trading community
of the muLtlLateral negotiations.
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-38-Table 1: LIst ot commodities, rgions, households
Commodltlos  Ret  olons
PDR  Paddy rice  BRA  Bnazil
GRO  Cereal grains  ARG  ArgentIna
OSD  Oil seeds  URY  Uruguay
AGR  other agriculture  CHL  ChiMe
OCR  Other crops'  COL  ColumbIa
CMT  Bovine meat products  PER  Peru
OMT  Other meat products  VEN  Venezuela
MIL  Dairy products  XAP  Rest of Andean Pact
PCR  Processed rice  MEX  Metdco
SGR  Sugar  XCM  Centra  America  and Caribbean
OFD  Other food products  XSM  Rest of South America
ENR  Energy and mining  CAN  Canada
TEX  Textiles  USA  UnIted States of America
WAP  Wearlng apparel  E._U  European  Union  15
LEA  Leather products  JPN  Japan
LUM  Wood  products  ROW  Restof World
MAN  Other manufacturIng
I_S  Iron and steel
FMP  Other metal products
MVH  Motor vehides and parts
SER  Services
CGD  Savings good
DWE  Dwellings
'Note.  Our 'other  crops'  Is  an aggregate  of the toOovoing  secto  from  the full OTAP  datbset: wheat,
vegetables and  fruits, fber base plants, wool, forestry, fhing and the OTAP  category other crops.
E'ctorm
CAP  Capital
LAB  Unskilled labor
LND  Land
RES  Natuiral resources
SKL  Skilled labor
Houhod 7Tpes and Charaefsdslcs
Rural  mean  mean  %  of  number of  Urban  mean  mean  %  of  number of  Monthly household Income
per capita  household  sample  househoids-  per capita  household  sample  iouseholda--  In 199e Rels
income'  income'  (in milions)  Income  Income'  (in millions)
Rhhl  48  129  5.89  6.10  Uhh1  63  135  4.38  4.54  0 -206
Rhh2  103  259  3.92  4.08  Uhh2  131  264  5.54  5.74  207 -313
Rhh3  116  384  2.64  2.73  Uhh3  155  375  6.14  6.36  314 -431
Rhh4  140  489  2.31  2.39  Uhh4  196  497  6.78  7.03  432 -564
Rhh5  165  647  1.87  1.94  Uhh5  239  649  7.34  7.61  565 -741
Rhh6  228  838  1.41  1.46  Uhh6  286  648  8.74  9.05  742 -964
Rhh7  286  1074  0.7  0.73  Uhh7  390  1123  9.27  9.60  965-  1290
Rhh8  385  1528  0.98  0.99  Uhh8  479  1581  8.06  8.38  1291 -1889
Rhh9  615  2282  0.32  0.33  Uhh9  752  2449  8.99  9.31  1890 -3196
RhhlO  2363  7864  1.52  1.58  UhhlO  2187  6728  13.22  13.70  3197 -668 9
Total Rural  21.54  22.31  Total Urban  78.46  81.27
Income  figures are In  1996 Reals.
The number of households the stratified sample  estimated to reprsent.
Sourme  Authorsbcalculations fom the LivIng Standards Messurement  Survey conducted by IBGE.
-39-Table 2: Structure of economic activity in Brazil
VA  Value added net of tax ($  millions)
VA%  Sectoral value added as a percent of aggregate value added
UNSK%  Unskilled labor share of value added, in percentage form
SKL%  Skilled labor share of vadlue added, in percentage form
CAP%  Capital share of value added, in percentage form
LAN%  Land share of value added, in percentage form
EXPORT  Value of exports
EXPORT%  Sector exports as a percentage of aggregate exports
Export Intensity  Sector exports as a percentage of domestic output
IMPORT  Value of imports
IMPORT%  Sector imports as a percentage of aggregata  imports;
Import Intensity  Sector imports  as a percentage of domestic demand
EXPORT  IMPORT
VA  VA%  UNSK%  SKL%  CAP%  LAN%  EXPORT  EXPORT%  INTENSITY  IMPORT  IMPORT%  INTENSITY
PDR  763  0.1  72  8  19  110  4
GRO  2449  0.3  71  8  18  3  47  1  144  3
OSD  2780  0.4  36  4  50  10  1795  3  28  419  8
AGR  15471  2.2  67  8  21  4  2986  5  7  646  1  2
OCR  33643  4.8  81  9  7  2  3923  7  7  2832  3  5
ENR  24736  3.5  9  4  87  4441  8  6  7742  9  9
CMT  2421  0.3  23  12  65  260  2  262  2
OMT  1088  0.2  23  12  65  1488  3  20  36  1
MIL  2473  0.4  13  13  74  596  1  5
PCR  168  23  24  52  252  6
SGR  483  0.1  28  25  47  1576  3  22
OFD  13699  1.9  17  18  65  1866  3  3  1936  2  3
TEX  4068  0.6  21  9  70  1060  2  5  1726  2  8
WAP  3545  0.5  32  14  54  205  1  710  1  4
LEA  1554  0.2  40  14  46  2300  4  31  573  1  10
LUM  4676  0.7  30  11  59  1765  3  12  383  3
MAN  60391  8.6  19  14  67  16615  29  9  41537  46  19
I_S  3359  0.5  12  4  84  4203  7  16  746  1  3
FMP  6788  1  39  17  44  725  1  3  1231  1  5
MVH  9865  1.4  15  7  79  5378  9  12  10273  11  21
SER  509359  72.4  27  24  49  7536  13  1  18046  20  2
Source: 1996 Brazilian 10 table and  GTAP database (version  5)
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UZ  02iLM  - i  LTable 4A: Household Income  shares from factors of production and transfers
Income  Shares lin  percentages)
Household*  Skilled  Unskilled  Rent from  Rent from  Transfers  Sum
labor  labor  Capital  Land
Rhhdl  5.7  68.1  2.9  1.1  22.2  100.0
Rhhd2  8.3  80.2  0.2  0.0  11.3  100.0
Rhhd3  10.8  86.7  0.2  1.7  0.7  100.0
Rhhd4  8.5  64.5  2.9  1.9  22.2  100.0
Rhhd5  10.9  56.8  32.3  0.0  0.0  100.0
Rhhd6  22.0  47.3  30.6  0.0  0.0  100.0
Rhhd7  8.8  49.2  41.7  0.3  0.0  100.0
Rhhd8  15.4  62.0  20.1  2.5  0.0  100.0
Rhhd9  18.3  45.0  35.3  1.4  0.0  100.0
Rhhd1O  7.3  75.3  14.8  2.7  0.0  100.0
Uhhdl  0.6  70.4  0.2  0.4  28.4  100.0
Uhhd2  18.1  67.2  0.6  0.3  13.9  100.0
Uhhd3  9.6  73.7  2,9  0.2  13.6  100.0
Uhhd4  13.4  67.8  8.5  0 2  10.1  100.0
Uhhd5  27.2  56.5  15.6  0 0  0.6  100.0
Uhhd6  28.1  52.4  19.4  0,0  0.0  100.0
Uhhd7  27.1  30.4  42.5  0.0  0.0  100.0
Uhhd8  32.9  27.9  39.2  0.0  0.0  100.0
Uhhd9  29.8  21.0  49.2  0.0  0.0  100.0
UhhdlO  16.6  14.8  68.6  0.0  0.0  100.0
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08~~~  0  N  E)'  W0  0)O)'  0  -)  N  S)  5T'able 5A: The  Imripact  of MERCOSUR Traide Policy Options on Different Countries
I  welfare  change as a percent  of consumption--  central elasticities)
_  _______________  _  AGREEMENTS'
F1AA  F-AA  EU - EU - FTAA  and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(excluded  1ERCOSUR  MERCOSLIR  EU - 50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excludet  MERCOSUR  cut  Uberalization  Liberalization
products i  by 50%
Country  I  )2)  _'3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Brazil  C.6  0.4  0.9  0.1  1.8  0.4  0.9  0.4
Argentina  -C.2  -0.2  2.3  0.2  2.2  0.2  0.3  0.2
Uruguay  1.7  1.6  43.9  1.2  43.4  1.4  7.8  0.4
Chile  1.1  1.1  -0.2  0.0  0.9  0.1  1.3  0.8
Columbia  1.7  2.0  -0.1  -0.1  1.7  0.0  1.0  1.7
Peru  1.0  1.0  -0.1  0.0  0.9  0.0  1.3  1.0
Venezuela  1.1  1.1  0.0  -0.1  1.1  0.0  0.9  1.1
Rest of Andean  Pact  1.9  2.0  0.0  0.0  1.9  0.1  2.5  1.8
Mexico  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.5  0.0
Central  America and Caribbean  4.3  4.8  0.0  0.0  4.4  0.0  2.1  4.6
Rest of South America  0.8  0.8  -1.2  0.1  0.0  0.3  4.1  0.1
Canada  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.1
United States of America  n.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
European  Union  15  -0.1  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.8  -0.1
Japan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.8  0.0
Restofthe World  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  2.3  -0.2
*  FTAA  Free Trade  Agreement of the Americas
FTAA (excluded products)  Free Trade Agreement  of the Amercas, vith US antdumping  policy denying  mproved access to Its four protected sectors
EU-MERCOSUR  A Free Trade Agreement betveen MERCOSUR  and the European  Uricn
EU-MERCOSUR  Excluded Products-  A Free Trade Agreement between MERCOSUR  end the European  Union  ,  with the most seven  most protected food
and agricultural products in the European  Union excluded  from the agreement
FTAA and EU-MERCOSUR  Free Trade Agreement of  the Americas combinetd with a  free trade  agreement between MERCOSUR  and the European Union
Unilateral  50% tariff cut-a MERCOSUR  only tariff cut by 50%.
Multilateral tariff liberalization-All regions  reduce tariffs  and export subsiclies by 50%.
FTAA (no  MERCOSUR llberalization)  Free lrade Agreement  of the Arnericas, but MEFCOSUR does nct change its own extemal tarff to the rest of the Americas.Table 5B: The Impact of MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options on Different Countries
(welfare  change as a percent of consumption- low elasticities)
AGREEMENTS*
FTAA  FTAA  EU - EU - FTAA and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(excluded  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  EU-  50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Uberalization  Lberalization
products)  by 50%
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Brazil  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.0  1.1  0.2  0.6  0.2
Argentina  -0.2  -0.2  1.2  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.5  -0.2
Uruguay  0.0  0.0  17.3  0.2  17.3  0.6  3.4  0.0
Chile  0.6  0.6  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  0.1  0.9  0.6
Coiumbia  1.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0  0.7  1.0
Peru  0.5  0.5  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.7  0.5
Venezuela  0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.6  0.7
Rest of Andean Pact  1.3  1.4  0.0  0.0  1.3  0.1  1.8  1.3
Mexico  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2
Central America  and Caribbean  3.1  3.3  -0.1  0.0  3.1  0.0  1.5  3.1
Rest of South America  0.2  0.2  -0.9  0.1  -0.4  0.4  1.9  0.2
Canada  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.1  -0.1
United States of America  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
European Union  15  -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.4  -0.1
Japan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.0  0.0
Rest of the World  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  1.4  -0.1
See Table 5A for description of Agreements.
-45-Table GA:  The Impact of MERCOSUR Trade PDlicy OptionE  on Different Countries
(welfare gain In billions of 1996 US dollars --  centiral elasticities)
________  _  _________________  AGREEMENTS'  __  |
FTAA  FTAA  EU - EU - FTM and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTM
(exduded  MERCOSUR  MAERCOSUR  EU-  50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Liberalization
lproducts)  by 50%
Country  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  _  (8)
8razl  3.1  2.3  5.0  0.5  9.5  1.9  4.6  2.3
Argentina  -0.5  -0.5  5.9  0.5  5.7  0.5  2.0  0.5
Uruguay  0.2  0.2  6.5  0.2  6.4  0.2  1.2  0.1
Chile  0.5  0.6  .0.1  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.7  0.4
Columbia  1.1  1.3  -0.1  -0.1  1.1  0.0  0.6  1.1
Peru  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.6  0.4
Venezuela  0.7  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.5  0.6
Rest of Andean Pact  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.5  0 3
Mexico  0.9  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  1.2  0 0
Central America  and Caribbean  3.4  3.8  0.0  0.0  3.5  0.0  1.7  3 6
Rest of South America  0.1  0.1  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0
Canada  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.8  0.2
United States of America  2.3  2.0  -0.4  -0.4  1.7  0.3  3.0  -0.5
European Union 15  -2.6  -2.2  25.0  5.6  21.2  1.6  39.3  -3.2
Japan  -1.0  -0.9  0.7  0.4  -0.5  0.3  45.7  -1 2
Rest of the World  -4.8  -4.2  -0.2  -0.2  -5.0  1.3  83.6  -5.6
Sum for Included Countries  12.7  12.4  42.3  6.9  51.6  NA  NA  9.1
Sum for Excluded Countries  -8.4  -7.2  -0.2  -0.4  -5.5  NA  NA  -9.9
Sum overall countries  4.3  5.2  42.2  6.4  46.1  NA  186.0  -0.9
* See Table 5A for description of Agreernents.
-46-Table 6B: The Impact of MERCOSUR  Trade Policy Options on Different Countries
(welfare  gain In billions of 1996 US dollars - low elasticities)
AGREEMENTS* 
FTAA  FTAA  EU-  EU-  FTM and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(excluded  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  EU-  50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Liberalization
products)  by 50%
Cojntry  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Brazil  1.2  0.7  3.1  -0.1  5.6  1.2  3.3  1.2
Argentina  -0.4  -0.5  3.2  -0.1  3.3  0.1  1.3  -0.4
Uruguay  0.0  0.0  2.6  0.0  2.5  0.1  0.5  0.0
Chile  0.3  0.3  -0.1  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.5  0.3
Columbia  0.6  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.5  0.6
Peru  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.2
Venezuela  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.4
Rest of Andean  Pact  0.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.2
MeKico  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.2  0.5
Central America and Caribbean  2.4  2.6  -0.1  0.0  2.4  0.0  1.2  2.4
Rest of South America  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
Catiada  -0.2  -0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  -0.2
United  States of America  3.5  3.3  -0.6  -0.6  2.6  0.4  2.7  3.5
European  Union  15  -2.5  -2.3  8.7  4.2  5.3  1.2  21.3  -2.5
Japan  -0.9  -0.9  0.2  0.2  -0.8  0.3  26.3  -0.9
Rest of the World  -3.6  -3.3  -1.1  -0.7  -4.5  0.9  51.8  -3.6
Surn for Included Countries  8.8  8.5  17.5  4.1  23.6  NA  NA  8.8
Surn for Excluded Countries  -7.0  -6.5  -1.9  -1.2  -5.3  NA  NA  -7.0
Surn over all countries  1.7  2.0  15.6  2.9  18.2  NA  110.9  1.7
See Table 5A for description of Agreements.
-47-Table 7:  Trade Policy Options Impact on Macro Variat les
(percentage change -central and loV elasticities)
AGREEMENTS  *
FTAA  FTAA  EU - EU - FTAA  and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(excluded  MERCOSUR  MAERCOSUR  EU - 50%  tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSLR
products)  'excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Liberalization
products)  by 50%
Elasticity  (  l)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (B)
Real exchange rate  central  2.61  2.73  2.2E  2.70  3.00  1.97  1.43  -0.2
low  1.86  2.01  1.08  1.89  1.98  1.82  1.20  1.9
Change in Tariff Revenue
as a %  of GOP  central  0.60  0.56  0.56  0.55  0.69  0.10  0.12  0.0
low  0.52  0.50  0.50  0.48  0.72  0.20  0.24  0.5
Unskilled labor wage  rate  central  2.91  1.87  4.24  2.42  5.81  0.94  3.02  0.0
low  1.61  1.05  2.51  1.38  3.64  0.73  2.04  0.7
Skilled laborwage  rate  central  0.97  1.01  1.12  0.60  1.77  0.54  0.31  1.1
low  0.66  0.65  0.85  0.44  1.37  0.46  0.48  1.6
Rental rate on capital  central  -0.13  0.18  -0.47  -0.39  -0.31  -0.08  -0.59  -0.1
low  0.17  0.32  0.00  -0.04  0.22  0.10  -0.09  0.2
Rental rate on land  central  14.21  9.19  25.12  14.84  31.00  5.79  30.00  4.4
low  6.31  3.94  13.19  7.38  16.76  3.56  16.27  6.3
See Table 5A for description of Agreements.
-48-Table  BA: The  Impact of MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options on  Brazilian  Households
(welfare  change as a percent of consumption-- central elasticities)
AGREEMENTS  *
FTAA  FTAA  EU - EU - FTAA  and  Unilateral  Multlateral  FTAA
(excluded  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  EU - 50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Liberalization
Household  products)  by 50%
types  (1  )  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Rhh1  2.5  1.7  4.0  2.1  5.5  1.5  2.9  0.8
Rhh2  2.3  1.5  3.9  1.8  5.4  1.2  2.8  1.0
Rhh3  2.5  1.5  4.5  1.9  6.2  1.1  3.5  1.3
Rhh4  2.5  1.8  3.9  2.2  5.4  1.5  3.1  0.8
Rhh5  1.3  0.8  2.3  0.7  3.5  0.6  1.8  0.8
Rhh6  1.5  1.0  2.3  0.8  3.6  0.7  1.7  0.8
Rhh7  1.3  0.9  2.0  0.7  3.2  0.6  1.6  0.7
Rhh8  3.1  2.0  4.8  2.4  6.9  1.2  4.1  1.4
Rhh9  0.9  0.4  1.7  0.6  2.6  0.4  1.8  0.7
Rhh1O  3.7  2.3  6.0  2.8  8.3  1.4  4.9  1.6
Uhhl  2.5  1.8  3.8  2.1  5.2  1.5  2.7  0.7
Uhh2  2.3  1.6  3.8  1.8  5.2  1.3  2.6  0.8
Uhh3  2.2  1.4  3.6  1.7  5.0  1.2  2.6  0.9
Uhh4  2.0  1.3  3.1  1.5  4.5  1.0  2.4  0.8
Uhh5  1.3  0.7  2.4  0.8  3.5  0.7  1.8  0.8
Uhh6  1.6  1.0  2.6  1.0  3.9  0.7  1.9  0.8
Uhh7  0.4  0.3  0.9  0.0  1.6  0.3  0.7  0.4
Uhh8  0.3  0.2  0.7  -0.1  1.4  0.3  0.7  0.4
Uhh9  -0.5  -0.4  -0.3  -0.7  -0.1  0.0  0.1  0.2
UhhlO  0.0  0.2  -0.2  -0.5  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.2
* See Table 5A for de scription of Agree ments.
-49-Table SB: The Impact  of  MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options on Brazillan Households
(welfare  change as a percent of consumption - low elasticitles)
AGREEMENTS'
FTM  FTM  EU-  EU-  FTM and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(exciuded  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  EU-  50% tariff  Tariff  no  MERCOSUR
products)  'exciuded  MERCOSUR  cut  Uberalization  Liberalization
Household  aroducts)  by 50%
tvpes  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Rhhl  1.2  0.9  2.0  1.1  3.0  1.1  1.8  1.2
Rhh2  1.1  0.7  2.0  0.9  3.0  0.8  1.8  1.1
Rhh3  1.1  0.6  2.4  0.9  3.5  0.7  2.2  1.1
Rhh4  1.2  0.9  2.0  1.1  2.9  1.1  1.9  1.2
Rhh5  0.6  0.3  1.3  0.3  2.0  0.4  1.2  0.6
Rhh6  0.7  0.5  1.4  0.4  2.2  0.5  1.2  0.7
Rhh7  0.6  0.4  1.2  0.3  1.9  0.4  1.1  0.6
Rhh8  1.5  0.9  2.7  1.2  4.0  0.8  2.6  1.5
Rhh9  0.2  0.0  0.9  0.1  1.3  0.2  1.0  0.2
RhhlO  1.8  1.0  3.4  1.4  4.9  1.0  3.1  1.8
Uhh1  1.2  0.9  1.9  1.1  2.8  1.2  1.7  1.2
Uhh2  1.1  0.7  2.0  0.9  2.9  0.9  1.7  1.1
Uhh3  1.0  0.6  1.9  0.8  2.8  0.8  1.6  1.0
Uhh4  0.9  0.6  1.6  0.7  2.5  0.7  1.5  0.9
Uhh5  0.5  0.2  1.3  0.3  1.9  0.4  1.1  0.5
Uhh6  0.7  0.4  1.5  0.4  2.3  0.5  1.3  0.7
Uhh7  0.1  0.0  0.5  -0.1  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.1
Uhh8  0.0  -0.1  0.4  -0.2  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.0
Uhh9  -OA  -0.4  -0.3  -0.6  -0.3  -0.2  0.0  -0.4
UhhlO  0.1  0.1  0.1  -0.2  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.1
^ See Table 5A fbr descripti on of Agreements.
-50-Table 9A: The Impact of MERCOSUR Trade Policy Options on Brazillan  Households
(welfare gain In billions of 1996 US dollars - central elasticities)
AGREEMENTS'
FTAA  FTAA  EU - EU - FTAA and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTM
(excluded  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR  EU - 50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Uberalizatfon
Household  products)  by 50%
types  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Rhhl  0.07  0.05  0.11  0.06  0.15  0.04  0.08  0.0
Rhh2  0.09  0.06  0.15  0.07  0.21  0.05  0.11  0.0
Rhh3  0.10  0.06  0.18  0.08  0.25  0.04  0.14  0.1
Rhh4  0.10  0.07  0.16  0.09  0.22  0.06  0.12  0.0
Rhh5  0.05  0.03  0.09  0.03  0.14  0.02  0.07  0.0
Rhh6  0.07  0.05  0.10  0.04  0.17  0.03  0.08  0.0
Rhh7  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.02  0.09  0.02  0.05  0.0
Rhh8  0.09  0.06  0.14  0.07  0.21  0.04  0.12  0.0
Rhh9  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.06  0.01  0.04  0.0
Rhhl  0.97  0.61  1.59  0.75  2.21  0.37  1.30  0.4
Uhhl  0.07  0.05  0.11  0.06  0.14  0.04  0.07  0.0
Uhh2  0.14  0.10  0.23  0.11  0.33  0.08  0.16  0.1
Uhh3  0.22  0.14  0.37  0.17  0.51  0.12  0.26  0.1
Uhh4  0.28  0.19  0.45  0.22  0.65  0.15  0.34  0.1
Uhh5  0.26  0.15  0.50  0.16  0.73  0.14  0.37  0.2
Uhh6  0.38  0.24  0.62  0.24  0.93  0.17  0.47  0.2
Uhh7  0.18  0.12  0.38  0.00  0.69  0.15  0.32  0.2
Uhh8  0.16  0.09  0.33  -0.04  0.67  0.14  0.33  0.2
Uhh9  -0.39  -0.36  -0.26  -0.56  -0.06  -0.01  0.06  0.2
UhhlO  0.10  0.48  -0.49  -1.12  1.04  0.23  -0.01  0.4
See Table 5A for d  escription  of Agreements.Table  9B: The  Impact  of MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options on Brazilian  Households
(welfare  gain in billions of 1996 US dollars - low elasticities)
AGREEMENTS
FTAA  FTAA  EU  EU - FTAA and  Unilateral  Multilateral  FTAA
(excluded  MERCOSUR  EU - 50% tariff  Tariff  no MERCOSUR
products)  (excluded  MERCOSUR  cut  Liberalization  Liberalization
Household  poducts)  by 50%
types  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4  _  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Rhhl  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.0
Rhh2  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.(3  0.12  0.03  0.07  0.0
Rhh3  0.05  0.02  0.10  0.03  0.14  0.03  0.09  0.0
Rhh4  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.05  0.12  0.04  0.08  0.1
RhhS  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.04  0.0
Rhh6  0.03  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.10  0.02  0.05  0.0
Rhh7  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.03  0.0
Rhh8  0.04  0.03  0.08  0.04  0.12  0.02  0.08  0.0
Rhh9  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.02  0.0
RhhlO  0.47  0.27  0.90  0.38  1.29  0.25  0.81  0.5
Uhhl  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.0
Uhh2  0.07  0.04  0.12  0.06  0.18  0.06  0.11  0.1
Uhh3  0.10  0.06  0.19  0.08  0.28  0.08  0.17  0.1
Uhh4  0.13  0.08  0.24  0.10  0.36  0.10  0.22  0.1
Uhh5  0.11  0.04  0.27  0.06  0.41  0.08  0.24  0.1
Uhh6  0.18  0.10  0.36  0.11  0.55  0.11  0.31  0.2
Uhh7  0.05  0.01  0.22  -0.05  0.39  0.08  0.22  0.1
Uhh8  0.02  -0.03  0.18  -0.09  0.35  0.06  0.22  0.0
Uhh9  -0.38  -0.38  -0.22  -0.47  -0.22  -0.13  -0.03  -0.4
Uhhl  0.11  0.25  0.18  -0.53  1.04  0.26  0.44  0.1
^ See Table 5A for description of  Agreements.
-52-Table I  OA:  The Impact of MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options on  Brazilian  Industry
(percentage change  in variable - central elasticities)
______  ______  ______  ______AGREEMENTS  *-
IEU-MERCOSUR  (excluded
FTAA  FTAA (excluded produ cts)  EU - MERCOSUR  ____  products)
output  price  exports  imports  output  price  exports  imports  output  price  -exprsiports  output  price  exports  imports
PDR  4  0  0  -11  4  0I  0  -16  18I  0  OSi  -51  4)  0  -7
GRO  11  - 6  - 1  - 20  -9  63Y  312  -0  iTi  -
OSD  21L  0  33  8  5  3  -20  21  0  - 14  51  20  0  -25t-27V
AGR  6  -2  16  -20  6  -3  19  -27  3011-1  72,  -21  1'?  -4-  3  3
OCR  9  -3  48  -2  3  -3  1  ~  1  1  7  - 7  2
ENR  2  3'  15  -18  3  -3  1  7  -20  _  0  -2  a8  23j  4  -4  161  -32
CMT  -6  -2  17  -16  6  3-3  -19  -22  3-6  -4-  801  0--6  l  u-  -4  16!  -21
OMT  8  -4  3-0  0  _  9  -4  34  0  791  -1 1  283'  1  5'-  -4  _1 
___  _  _  ~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~-i--  4- --  ,  - 1~
MIL  -7  -- 2  0  :-~67  7  3  0  -65  8,  -1  0  70)  2  -4  -~0  -14
PCR  3  3  0-  -11  27  -36  0  -13  12~  -1,  0i  82  I_  1,
SGR  27  -7  54  0  1  -6  34  0  1324  -131  255'  01  151  65  30  0
OFDJ  2  -- 3  26,  26  2  --- 4t-27  -2312  -4-  -129  841  3  3  10  -12
TEX  ~~~~~~~~  ~~~  ~~~~~~~~~-3  - -3  5  1 8  -2  _  -41  7  14  -d  -- 3  4  53  4  it 2
WAP  -3  -3  6  52  -3  -4  8  45,  -6  ~-2  3~  89  -
LEA  ~~~76  -6~8  139  -47  82  - - 19  -50  171  -d3  ~6  571  -27j
LUM  -4  -4  6-  131  -41  -41  8  121  __-j__-2!  2'  139  2  4  i-I64  j  -
MAN  -6  -4  -6  54  -141  -51  -5  50  -24  -4'  -21  74  -16  -5  -11  5
I-S-  0  16  -6  0  0  19  --9  -16  -0  - 9-  32  -0-  0  5  12
FMP  -10  -4  -10  -2  -9  -5  -7  73  21  -5  -26.  -216  -15,  -5  -20  161
MVH  -6  -6  5.  16  -7  -6  7  15  -7'  -2  -15  4
SER  1  2  1  3  3.  14  -34  1  -1  - 1  -3  _16  -36 OWE  0  -2,  0I.:  0  a 4 m  1--3  _
AGREEMENTS*_____  ____
Multilateral tariff  liberalizatiorn  by  FrFAA  no  MERCOSUR
FTAA  and  EU - M ERCOSUR  Unilateral  50% tariff cut  501%  liberalization
output  price  exports  imports  output-  price  exports  imports  output  price  exports  imports  output  nrrca  exports  imports
Sectors  (5  (6)  (7)  (8)
PDR  18  0  0  -43  0'l  0  0  -- 1  11  0  0.  -33  -3  0  0  2
GRO  53  2  12,-47  7  -21  11  -6  33  2  47  -31  2i  2
OSD  29  '0  29t  121  12  01  19  -13  64  01  99-~  -60  0_  2  1
AGR  32  -1  75  5  3  -31  13  -15  16  -1' 56,  -42  29  2  _1  -2
OCR  11  Oi  44  25  2  -3  II1  3-  7__ 0  _  25~  -2  6  1  61  2
ENR  -2  -3  10  -16  2  -3  13  -13  -2  -it-  5  -3  -- 2  1  1  1
CMT  38  84  07  -67  2  -3  13  -14  12  _1'  143~  81  21  2  1  2
OMT  84  -11  300  1  4  -3  13  0  27  __4-  96:  - -34  1  3  4
MIL  9  - 1  0  -71  -2  -3i  0  29  41  -1  0  24  ..  2  04 
PCR  12 -- ~1  01  -73  0  -3.  0  1  31  -0  0  -16  1  I  0  2
SGR  15  14  289  0  1  0  -5  21  0  36  5  70  0)  a  0  _3  0
OFO  ~~~~13  -4  36  95  -1  -3  _  5  27  6  1l  34  5  3  1  3 
TEX  - -11  -4  -1,  65  -6  4  - 33 __-9  21  39  21  1  2  1
WAP  -7  -3  31  124  -4  - -6  55  -4,  -1  6  71  __l  1  2  1
LEA  74  -7  1341  -41  -9  -4'  19  4  -0  2  5  31-  35-  1  5  1
LUM  -6  -3  31  218  0  -3  7  39  -3  1  2  69  0  1  1~  1
MAN  -29  -5  -221  97  -9  -4  -6  28  _  -15  2  14!  47  2i___1  2~  0
FMP  01  -0  1  2  -1-23  -6  -24  230  -7  -4  -9  60  -10  21  I  8  0
MVH  -9  -5  1  1  1
SER  1  -13  1  -3  1  7  :1j  1  0 
DWE  1  - 0{0  0  -3  0  0  1  0  02_ 
*See  Table 5A for  description of Agreements.
-53-Table  1OB: The  Impact of MERCOSUR  Trade Policy Optlons on Brazilian Industry
(percentage  change  in variable --  low elastk:ities)
AGREEMENTS  '
EU-MERCOSUR  (excluded
FTAA  FTA  (excluded products)  EU - MERCOSUR  products)
output  price  exports  imports  output  price  exports  imports  c,utput  price  exports  imports  output  price  exports  Imports
Sectors  (1)  (2)  3__  ()  (
PDR  2  0  O  -7  2  0  0  -9  11  o0  -45  2  0  0  -3
GRO  3  -2  8  3_  3  3  -2  10  -1  22  3  35  -32  5  -2  10  -3
OSD  8  0  15  21  6  0  12  21  10  C  3  27  10  0  13  -11
AGR  3  -2  9  -1  2  -2  10  -5  16  C  35  21  6  -3  38  -8
OCR  5  -2  30  1_1  1  -2  7  4  4  1  9  -2  4  -2  19  -15
ENR  0  -2  8  -4  1  -2  9  -6  -1  -1  2  -5  2  -3  10  -14
CMT  2  -2  8  -5  2  -2  10  -7  25  -3  719  -85  2  -3  10  -9
OMT  3  -2  13  0  4  -3  15  0  33  -5  128  0  3  -3  11  C_0
MIL  4  -1  0  -40  3  -2  0  -39  4  C  0  -45  1  -3  0  -10
PCR  1  -2  0  -8  1  -2  0  -9  5  C  0  -45  1  -2  0  -3
SGR  16  -4  36  0  7  -4  17  0  99  -iC  220  0  6  -4  15  i0
OFD  2  -2  20  16  1  -3  21  13  7  -1  82  31  2  -2  7  -10
TEX  -1  -3  8  13  -1  -3  9  11  -1  -1  4  22  -2  -3  5  13
WAP  0  -2  12  18  0  -3  14  15  0  -1  7  19  -1  -3  5  16
LEA  32  -5  66  -22  34  -5  70  -24  7  -,  14  0  14  -4  28  -11
LUM  -1  -3  7  51  0  -3  9  47  -2  -1  3  50  1  -3  12  32
MAN  -7  -3  1  25  -6  -4  3  23  -11  2  -9  35  -7  -4  -2  21
I_S  1  0  15  3  2  0  17  1  -9  i  -4  30  -4  0  6  17
FMP  -4  -3  1  27  -3  -3  2  24  9  -i  -12  88  -7  -4  -8  65
MVH  -4  -4  6  14  -3  -4  7  13  9  - -15  12  -7  -3  -9  1  0
SER  0  -2  7  -12  0  -2  8  -15  0  ci  1  -1  0  -2  10  -17
DWE  0  -2  0  0  0  -2  0  0  0  I  0  0  0  -2  0  0
AGREEMENTS  '
M\ultilateral  tariff liberalization by  FTAA no  MERCOSUR
RTAA and EU - MERCOSUR  Unilateral  50% ta riff cut  50%  liberalization
output  price  exports  Imports  output  price  exports  Imports  output  price  exports  imports  output  price  exporis  imports
Sectors  ( )  _  _()  I7 
PDR  12  0  0  -43  0  0  0  -1  6  ()  0  -20  2  0  _  0  -1
GRO  21  2  34  -22  3  -2  7  -3  13  2  14  -14  31  -1  -1  -1
OSD  13  0  12  67  7  0  13  -2  35  II  59  -20  8i  0  0  -5
AGR  18  -1  39  28  2  -3  10  -1  10  -I  44  -10  31  -2  -1  -2
OCR  7  0  31  9  1  -31  9  2  5  ol  21  -1  5  -2  3  -2
ENR  -2  -1  4  -2  1  -3  10o  -6  -21  I  4  2  0  -2  -1  -2
CMT  27  -3  732  -75  1  -3  10|  -7  6  - 111  -54  2  -2  -1  -1
OMT  36  -i  136  0  3  -3  11i  0  20  -4  76  0  3  -2  0  -2
MIL  5  0  0  -51  -1  -3  0  14  2  -1  0  -10  4  -1  0  5
PCR  6  -1  0  -46  0  -3  0  0  o  2  ol)  0  -10  1  -21  0  -1
SGR  112  -12  248  0  6  -4  15  0  24  -4  551  0  16  -4  1  0
OFD  8  -3  91  46  0  -3 _  5  17  4  -j  29  3  2  -2  -4
TEX  -2  -3  9  36  -4  -41  -4  22  -5  -22  -4  28  -1  -3  -- 1  -4
WAP  -1  -2  15  40  -2  -3  -2  36  -2  -1  -3  47  0  -2  0  -4
LEA  33  -5  67  -15  5  -4  13  12  -4  -. 21  -31  32  32  -5  2  -2
LUM  -2  -2  7  91  0  -31  7  21  _  -1  -1  4  34  -1  -3  0  -7
MAN  -15  -4  -8  52  -5  -3  -1  15  -8  _  -. 2  -6  25  -7  -3  -1  -6
I_S  -7  0  7  33  -1  °I0  a  7  -4  -__  2  14  1  °  - 0  0°  -4
FMP  -11  -4  -8  100  -4  -4  4  30  -51  -21  -6  41  -4  -3  -1  -6
MVH  -9  -4  -3  20  -3  -3  -21  -41  -1  -3  7  -4  -4  -1 |  -8
SER  0  -1  2  -4  0  -2  IC  1  -18  0o  __  |  2  -3  0  -2  0  0
OWE  0  -1  0  0  0  -3  C  0  31  2  0  0  0l  -2  0  0
^ See Table 5A  for description of  Agreements.
-54-Table 11: Decomposition of the Impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
on Brazilian Households
(percentage change in welfare - central elasticities)
AGREEMENTS*
FTAA  FTAA  FTAA  FTAA
uniform  uniform  income  with 1-0
consumption  shares  factor shares
shares
Household types  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Sum  over all
households  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5
Rhhl  2.5  2.0  1.0  0.5
Rhh2  2.3  1.8  0.7  0.3
Rhh3  2.5  2.0  0.5  0.1
Rhh4  2.5  2.1  0.9  1.0
Rhh5  1.3  0.8  0.5  0.4
Rhh6  1.5  0.7  0.9  0.7
Rhh7  1.3  0.6  0.7  0.5
Rhh8  3.1  2.8  1.0  2.2
Rhh9  0.9  1.2  0.0  0.8
RhhlO  3.7  3.2  1.1  2.0
Uhhl  2.5  2.0  1.0  0.4
Uhh2  2.3  1.8  0.9  0.2
Uhh3  2.2  1.8  0.7  0.0
Uhh4  2.0  1.6  0.7  0.9
Uhh5  1.3  1.0  0.3  0.1
Uhh6  1.6  1.4  0.6  0.4
Uhh7  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.1
Uhh8  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.0
Uhh9  -0.5  0.0  -0.3  -0.3
Uhh1O  0.0  0.1  0.9  0.9
-55-Table  12: Optimizing  MERCOSUR  Trade  Policy Options: Impact on  Brazilian Households and Aggregate Impact (welfare
change as a percent of consumption - central elasticities)
AGREEMiENTS  '
_TAA (excluded  FTAAM  +  EU-  FTAA +  EU-MERCOSUR
produ(eclude  +  TA  EL-  MERCOSUR  FTAARCOEU-  (excluded prodicts)+
Hueod Unilateral  tariff cut  MERCOSUR  (excluded  exlddpout)Tariff  Uniformity in  Multilateral  Liberalization
types  h ME  R  b  (exduded product)  products)+  50%  +Multilatera  pd  T  MERCOSUR  by  50% +  Taribf
50%  unilateral  tanff cut  Liberaliateon  by  O%  Uniformity  in
in  MERCOSUR  MERCOSUR
(t)  _  (2)  _  (3) ___  (4)  _(5)  (6)
;um  over all
ouseholds  0.72  0.85  0.97  1.15  0.66  1.36
thhl  2.24  3.07  3.26  3.26  1.54  4.70
hh2  1.93  2.79  2.96  2.96  1.34  4.32
Ihh3  1.90  2.97  3.13  3.13  1.24  5.19
thh4  2.29  3.16  3.34  3.34  1.54  4.95
'hh5  1.12  1.61  1.75  1.75  0.86  2.65
Lhh6  1.41  1.88  2.04  2.04  1.11  2.85
hh7  1.26  1.71  1.85  1.85  0.95  2.68
hh8  2.44  3.71  3.86  3.86  1.43  6.44
hh9  0.72  1.15  1.25  1.25  0.55  2.34
hh1O  2.76  4.30  4.46  4.46  1.55  7.53
hhl  2.26  3.04  3.23  3.23  1.56  4.43
hh2  2.02  2.80  2.98  2.98  1.47  4.24
hh3  1.85  2.64  2.80  2.80  1.31  4.07
hh4  1.71  2.43  2.58  2.58  1.23  3.72
hh5  1.10  1.58  1.72  1.72  0.96  2.59
hh6  1.39  1.97  2.12  2.12  1.09  3.06
hh7  0.59  0.67  0.81  0.81  0.69  1.11
hh8  0.48  0.54  0.66  0.66  0.61  0.91
hh9  -0.21  -0.39  -0.29  -0.29  0.18  -0.32
hhlO  0.47  0.29  0.41  0.41  0.47  0.29
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Incorporating the 1996 Brazilian Input-Output Table Into the GTAP5 Data
Introduction
This appendix documents the steps undertaken to replace the GTAP5 dataset for Brazil with
data from the  1996 Brazilian Input-Output table, using the GAMS  (General Algebraic Modeling
System) language. The motivation behind this replacement is that the original Brazilian database in
GTAP5 is from 1985, and was re-balanced to match the Brazilian GDP in 1997. The Brazilian
economy has changed structurally since the 1980's, due to changes as higher trade liberalization, less
government intervention in the economy, and decreases  in the rate of inflation. The availability of
more recent data for the Brazilian  economy made it feasible to update the GTAP5 database for
Brazil.
There are several steps in the process:
*  The Brazilian Input-Output (10) table from 1996 was used. These data are produced bythe
IBGE  (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, with home page wwwl.ibge.gov.br).
IBGE publishes the 10 tables for Brazil in the form of many different sub-tables, each of
which shows different facets of the national accounts.  The Brazilian IO tables are directly
available at the IBGE home page.
*  These tables were transported from an Excel file to a GAMS data file. The 1996 Brazilian
IO table was relabeled to match the GTAP5 description of goods  and sectors. In some cases
some aggregation was done. However, it was not possible to match all goods described in
the GTAP5 aggregation. To make both source of data comparable, the GTAP5 database
was also aggregated to match the aggregated IO table.
*  The IO table has more goods than sectors, so the sectors were dis-aggregated to match the
list of commodities,  using as weights the shares of the value of production of each
commodity in the total value of production by sector.
*  After the information in the IO table was  dis-aggregated into an equal number of sectors
and commodities,  the data was organized to have the same GTAP5 arrays, and then checked
for consistency using standard GTAP criteria. Finally, data pertaining to taxes on
production, taxes on intermediate  demand, taxes on final consumption, the value of factors
usage, the value of intermediate  input used by sector, the value of government demand and
the value of private demand, were replaced in the original GTAP5 database. This
replacement step utilized the GTAPinGAMS  tools documented in Rutherford and Paltsev
[2000], and available on the web. These tools were originally developed to undertake
replacements  of this kind. The original GTAP5 trade flows and trade protection data (import
tariffs and export taxes) were retained. The original GTAP data were replaced by formally
minimizing the difference  between the original data and the new data, keeping the GTAP5
data about trade flows  and trade protection unaltered, and ensuring that the new data
satisfied all GTAP balancing requirements.
This appendix details  this process of updating the GTAP5  database for Brazil.
The 1996 Brazilian IO table
The Brazilian IO tables are produced by the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics)  as part of the National Account informnation. The  1996 IO table was the most recent as of
2001, when our data analysis was undertaken.  Pardal national account data for 1997 and 1998 are
already available, but do not include data on intermediate and final demand tax revenues  by sector
A-1and commodity. Hence we chose to use the 1996 10 table, which  was complete.
The Brazilian  1996 IO table is organized in numerous Excel files, each representing  several
distinct sub-tables.  The tables we utilized  are:
*  Table 1 - includes the value  of production (80 commodities being produced by 43 sectors);
imports CIF (80 commodities and 2 columns: imports without exchange emissiorL and
import of goods and services); and supply (80 commodities  and 9 columns: total supply at
consumer prices, commerce margin, transport margin, import tariffs, taxes in industrial
production, taxes in goods circulation, other taxes, total taxes, and total supply at producer
prices);
*  Table 2 - includes inteminediate demand  (80 commodities being used in 43 sectors); final
demand (80 comnnodities  and 8 columns: exports without exchange emission, goods and
services exports, public administration consumption,  famnlies consumption, gross formation
of fixed capital, stock variation, final demand and total demand); and value added
components  (43 sectors and 14 rows: gross value added at basic price, remunerations,  wiages,
effective social contributions, social welfare  public, social welfare private, social contribution
imputed, gross operational surplus  inclusive of autonomous revenue, autonomous  revenue,
gross operational surplus, other production taxes, other production subsidies, value  of
production,  and labor occupied);
*  Table 6 - burden of the ICMS taxes, whlich are  taxes on commodity circulation,  on domestic
products  (80 commodities, 43 sectors  and 8 final demand columns);
*  Table 7 - burden of the ICMS taxes on imported products  (80 commodities, 43 sectors and 8
final demand colunns);
*  Table 8 - burden of IPI taxes, which are taxes  on industrial production, on domestic
products  (80 commodities,  43 sectors  and 8 final demand  columns);
*  Table 9 - burden of IPI taxes  on imported products (80 commodities,  43 sectors and 8 final
demand columns);
*  Table 10 - distribution of trade  margins; on dornestic prodlucts  (80 commodities, 43 sectors
and 8 final demand columns);
*  Table 11 - distribution of trade margins  on imported products  (80 commodities,  43 sectors
and 8 final demand colunns);
*  Table 12 - distribution of transport margins on domestic  products  (80 conmmodities,  43
sectors and 8 final demand colunns); and
*  Table 13 - distribution of transport  nargins  on imported products  (80 commodities, 43
sectors and 8 final denmand columns).
Extiacting the infonnation from the IO table to GAMS
The first step was to get the data from the 10 table in Excel files into GAMS text file.
Converting the raw data to GAMS  at this initial step rrakes all of our calculations transparent to
other researchers.
We introduced one row and one colurm between the name of sectors/commodities/agents
and the numerical data in the spreadsheet.  Than we enumerate each new cell in an increasing order,
so that we will have a number associated with each sector or conmmodity or agent in the IO table.
We then select all numerical data in the  sheet, irncluding the new row and column
numerated.  The names of the sectors/commodities/agents  do not need to be selected. Then we
create a name for the area selected, what will permit GAMS to recognize the data by this name. To
create this name, we click on the tool bar "Insert" in the main menu of Excel, and then in the
A-2option "Name"  and in the option 'Define".  A window will be opened,  asking for a name for the
selected area. After a name has been defined, GAMS  can recognize the data from the Excel file
directly.
The GAMS program to extract the data should have a definition of the sets of columns and
rows that will be extracted. For example, if one wants to extract a table with data about intermediate
demand, with 20 commodities in rows and 10 sectors in columns, one must first define a set for
rows, ranging from 1  to 20, and a set for columns, ranging from 1 to 10. Then on must define a
paramneter, which is a GAME  name for a multi-dimensional  matrix, which will store the data and
have the same size as the cardinality of the sets defined.
Finally, the GAMS libinclude  XLI  IORT tool' is used to get the data from the IO table. The
following example shows the syntax to extract the IO data from an Excel file to GAMS.
*  GAMS code to extract data about  Intermediate demand from an IO table:
set  iid /1*82/,  jid/1*44/;
parameter ind(iid,jid);
$libinclude xlimport  ind Io_br_96.xls  id
display ind
The code above starts with the declaration of sets. The iid and jid sets are used respectively for the
rows and columns of the table in excel with intermediate demand data. In this case, we have 82
commodities  (or 81 commodities  plus one row with the total)  and 44 sectors (or 43 sectors plus one
column with the total).  After the set declaration, the parameter "ind(iid,jid)"  is defined.  This
parameter will store the intermediate  demand data as a GAMS  parameter. The next line contains the
libinclude function: xlimport is the command which gets the data from the Excel; "ind"  is the name
of the parameter which will receive the data; Io_br  96.xls is the file containing the source data, and
id is the area which contains the data in the Excel fie. This is the same area that we selected and
gave a name to above.
We applythis procedure for each of the data sets of the 1996 Brazilian IO table that we
needed.
Finally, we created a file to store the parameters  extracted from the IO data. This file has the
extension "dat," and is created using another libinclude function, GAMS2PRM.  The  following
example shows this process:
*  GAMS code to  store the data from an IO table:
file kdat /Io_br_96.dat/; put kdat;
$1ibinclude gams2prm sup sO
$libinclude gams2prm imp mO
$libinclude gams2prm vp yO
$libinclude gams2prm fd do
$libinclude gams2prm va vO
$libinclude gams2prm ind idO
I  The GAMS libinclude is  a set of programs that reside in the GAMS "library" directory, and which can be
accessed by GAMS. These tools are often added by users, and allow GAMS to be extended significantly between
major version updates. They also allow users to access programs that are not tested by GAMS, and which may
perform specialized  functions that are not desired by the wider GAMS conmnunity.  The GAMS web site,
http://www.gams.com,  contains more information and downloads.
A-3These rows create a new file,  [o_br_96.dat. Also, this code uses the tool GAMS2PRM to include the
parameters sup, imp, vp, fd, va and ind, extracted from the IO table.  These parameters  will have  a
different name in the new dat file, respectively,  sO, mO,  yO,  dO,  vO and idO. Thus we are renaming the
arrays  at the same time that we save them to disk.
Re-labeling  thte data
The next step is to lah  el the data extracted  from the IO table to replace the numerical labels
with character labels, and re-label these to match the G1TAP labels  for conmmodities.
The first sub-task is t0 create the different sets irnvolved in this re-labeling process.  We create
sets for the original sectors arcl commocdities  in the IO table, and sets for the columnns or rows of
final demand, supply, value  added and the imports data sets. It is Ulso necessary to define the set of
sectors using GTAP notation, since we want the data from the IC) table to match.
We defined  42 sector  and commodities  from the original GTAP5 sectors and commodities,
which means that our IO table needed to be reorganized to matchl these 42 commodities. Note that
GTAP5 has 58 sectors  artd cc,mmodities  (including the sector CGD - capital goods).  The Brazilian
IO table does not have enouph dis-aggregated information to match the 58 original GTAP5 sectors.
Thus it was necessaryto creaie a GTAAP5  aggregation  of the 58 sectors to 42 sectors, so that the IO
table could be re-labeled.  Table 1 shows the aggregation of the  58;  original GTAP sectors to the 42
sectors; later in this Appendix we shows the complete  correspondence  between the IO commodilies
and GTAP5.
After we create  all of the sets that are nmeded,  wze can mnap the IO commodities  to match the
48 sectors form GTAP5.  The mapping process for commodities  consists of defining a set of
commodities i, called mapi, anld then stating the corresponding commodity or comnmodities  in
GTAP. An example illustratei this step:
*  GAMS  code  to rela-oel  iata  fron IO  tD GTAP5  format:







DWE.80  /  ;
Itn this example the set mapi  .ieeds to be associated to  the set of GTAP5 sectors  (set i in parenthesis)
and to the set of IO commocdties  (set ios).  The number 3 corresponds  to the third row of the
original IO table, which desc;-ibes  U  nprocessecd  Rice, vwhich is PDR in the GTAP notation. We can
see from this example that GTAP sectors OCIR and OSG are each associated with 3 different
cormodities  in the IO table.
We have fewer sectois than commodities  in the Brazilian IO table. To re-balance the table
we create a set with codes (tree letters as in the GTAP sectors  description) for each sector in the
IO table. Notice that these sc ctors  do not correspond to the GTAP sectors; later in this appencdi
we list the correspondence  between these codes and the IO sectors. We also aggregate somne sectors
that are more dis-aggregated  in the IO data than in GTAP. For example, the Brazilian IO table has 5
different sectors thlat are aggregated  as CRP (Chermicals, Rubber and Plastics) in GTAP.
After declaring the sets and mapping the 10 commodities  into GTAP forrat, we declare the
A-4parameters that we want to put in GTAP format. These parameters  have the same name that we
used to store the data in the dat file. The numbers  of parameters created to re-label the IO data
should be equal to the number of parameters  used to store the data. The sets associated with the
new parameters will be the sets with the GTAP code, the sets created for sectors in the IO table,
and the several sets corresponding to rows and columns of final demand, supply,  imports and value
added data sets.
Since we have already declared the parameters  and sets, we can include the file where  the IO
data is stored. This is done using the following GAMS code:
$include  io_br_96.dat
where io_br_96.dat is the file created earlier to store all the data extracted from the IO table.
Now we need to put the original IO data into the new parameters  that were created,
applying the the re-labeling.  The following GAMS  code shows an example how to do this:
*  GAMS code to pass the data from the IO table to parameters labeled in GTAP
format:
yO_(i,j)  sum((ios,jos)$(mapi(i,ios)*mapj(j,jos)),  yO(ios,jos));
mO_(i,jm)  =  sum(mapi(i,ios),  mO(ios,jm));
sO_(i,js)  sum(mapi(i,ios),  sO(ios,js));
do_(i,jd)  =  sum(mapi(i,ios),  dO(ios,jd));
vO_(iv,j)  sum(mapj(j,jos),  vO(iv,jos));
idO_(i,j)  =  sum((ios,jos)$(mapi(i,ios)*mapj(j,jos)),  idO(ios,jos));
This code shows that the original IO data on the value of production, yO,  will be called yO_, and it
will aggregate (sum) the commodities  and sectors  mapped from the sets ios  (10 commodities)  and
jos (10 sectors) to the sets i (GTAP commodities)  and j (aggregated sectors from IO). The same
step is applied to the other data. The sets jm, js, jd and iv are not aggregated, because they
correspond to the columns or rows in the imports, supply, final demand and value added original IO
data sets, respectively.  In this manner we preserve the form of the data extracted from the IO table.
Now that we have the data re-labeled and stored in new parameters,  we save these
parameters  in a dat file, as we did before for the data extracted from the IO. We use the same
GAMS notation used above to create the file  Io_br_96.dat, orly changing the name of the dat file.
Making adjustments  in the IO data
Now that we have the original IO data re-labeled in a GTAP classification of commodities,
we need to do some adjustments in the data.  These adjustments  can be different for different kinds
of original IO tables. In the Brazilian case, we were concerned about the following characteristics  of
the original IO data:
*  that the number of sectors  was different than the number of commodities;
*  values were measured in 1996 Brazilian currency,  and
*  the presence of a sector used to correct the value of GDP.
These characteristics  require adjustments to the IO data, explained below.
A new GAMS file is created to do these adjustments. We declare the sets for commodities (i)
and sectors  (), as well as the sets for rows and columns used in the other files. We declare the
parameters,  using the same names that they received in the last dat file created. Then we include the
file that has these data, using the same notation shown before. Finally, we create the parameters that
will contain the data after all adjustments necessaries.
A-5The first adjustment deals with the sector used to correct the value of GDP. This sector was
created in the IO table by IBGE to allow the nneasure. of the ser-ices in the total intermediate
demand paid as interest in financial transactions. As there is no infornnation available on the value  of
interest paid byeach sector, the sector Financial Dumrrty was created to incorporate the total of
these payments. The intermrediate demand section of t6e IO table shows this sector paying somrLe
amount to use the commodity financial services, and in the value added section the same value is
discounted from the capital row. The methodology used to build the IO table uses the fiaancial
dummy as an artifice to avoid an overvaluation of GDF', when GDP is measured bythe value  added
in the economy.
The usual procedure  employed by researchers  inl Brazil to deal with this is to simply
eliminate the financial dummy sector, splitng it's transactions  amnong all other sectors in the 10
table. The financial dummy sector needs to be eliminat:ed because it is not an observed sector in the
economy.  We used the share of each sector in the use of the finamcial services  as weights.  Thus the
positive values of the financial dummy sector in intermediate  consumption will be added to the use
of financial services of each sector, and the negative va]ues in the value added will be added to the
row for capital of each sector.
After we split the financial dummy sector among all other sectors, we need to put the values
in the IO table in the same units used in GTAP5. The GTAPinG,AMS; program uses monetary
values denominated in terms of tens of billions of U.S, dollars.  We therefeore  create two scalars in
GAMS, one scale factor to multiply all data by 1Oe-7,  and an exchange  rate factor, to convert tde
data in Brazilian currencyto US$ doDars.  The exchange rate factor is applied to all parameters. We
also create a scalar that rescales the data in the IO table to matchL the Brazilian value of GDP in
GTAP5. We multiply all parameters  bythis scalar. This will convert the data from the 1996 IO table
to 1997 values.
The last adjustment is to transform thfe  number of sectors to match the same number of
commodities. We do this by the procedure of diagonalization of the data. In other words, we use the
share of each commodity in the value of production of the sector as a weight to split the number of
sectors in the IO table to be the same numnber of commnodities. 'We sum the value of production of
each conmuodityproduced  bymnnysectors, and assume that the total value of the commnodity
produced by the sector that has the same narn  of the commodity. In other words, we assume  a
technology in which each sector produces only one commnodity. Here is this procedure in GAMS:
*  GAMS code to diagonalize the IO table to have eqi.al  number of  commodities
and sectors
theta(i,j)$sum(ii,  yO(ii,j))  =  yO(i,j)  / surn(ii,  yC(ii,j));
id(i,ii)  =  rescgdp  *  scalefac *  sum(-j,  idO(:L,j)  *  theta(ii,j))  /  exchrate
v(k,i)  = rescgdp *  scalefac  *  sum(j,  vO(k,j)  *  theta(i,j))  /  exchrate
y(i)  =  rescgdp *  scalefac *  sum(j,  yO(i,j))  /  exchrate  ;
In this code theta is the parameter that calculates the shares of each commodity in the total value
produced by a sector, yO, idO and vO are the re-labeled paramrete:rs  for value of production,
intermediate  demand and value added, respectively,  id, v and y are the new parameters  for
intermediate  demand, value added and value cf production, resFectively, after all adjustments;
rescgdp, scalefac and exchmate  are the scalars used to rescale GDP and adjust for exchange rate
units. The diagonalization process is done at same time that the other adjustments are done. IrL  the
new parameters  (y,  id and v), the set used to sectors is now the same used for commodities  (i or ii).
Some data, such as the data about total supply, do not need to be diagonalized since they are
A-6organized solely by commodities.  However, they still need to be adjusted bythe scalar factors.
Before storing the diagonalized and adjusted parameters, we apply a check on the parameters
to ensure that the different adjustment process were done correctly. This check verifies the zero
profit condition and supply-demand balance. In other words, we check if the new IO data, after
being re-labeled,  diagonalized,  tumnbled, dried, and otherwise  adjusted, is still consistent.
Denomnating the IO data in GTAP arrays
The next step in the preparation of the Brazilian IO table to replace the original GTAP5
data is to identify the parameters in the IO table that are used in the GTAP arrays, and give the
corresponding name to them.  These parameters should correspond to the parameters  explicitly
represented in the GTAPinGAMS  dataset, which are shown in Table 2. The data pertaining to trade
flows, trade protection and transport services, however, cannot be changed in the original GTAP5
database.
To undertake this task we declare the sets for the GTAP sectors and commodities, and then
declare the sets for rows and columns in the import, value added, supply and final demand data sets.
We declare the parameters stored in the last dat file, and we include this dat file.
We then declare parmeters  in the form of GAMS arrays, and define each parameter to the
corresponding  10 parameter. First, it is necessary to be careful to the way that the data in the IO is
presented  (e.g., if it is net or gross of taxes) and the current definition of the parameter in GTAP
array. Second, the taxes rates should be extracted here, since the IO data usually shows tax  me,
and the GTAPinGAMS programs work with tax rates. Third, the intermediate  demand for the
sector CGD (Capital Goods) should be defined separately,  since investments  are normally
represented in the final demand table in the IO.
For the Brazi;ian IO table, the data about trade and transport margins is included in the
intermediate demand and final demand data.  This means that the Brazizian  IO table is valued at
consumer prices. Tables  10 through 13 of the IO table show how trade and transport margins are
attributed to each sector. We removed the trade and transport margins from each commodity being
consumed by the sectors or by the agents,  and add them to the commodity TRD, which covers
trade and transports services.
After defining the GTAP arrays using the values  from the IO table, it is necessary to again
check the consistency of the data in GTAP format. These consistency conditions  are written using
the notation of the GTAPinGAMS  programs.  One way to write the condition of supply equal
demand is to use the equation for the parameter "market," defined in the GTAPinGAMS
documentation.  This parameter can be represented by the equation:
market(r,i)  =  vdfm(i,r)  + vifm(i,r)  - sum(j, vafm(i,j,r))
where vdfm(i,r) is the aggregate  intermediate  domnestic and vifm(i,r) is the aggregate intermediate
demand imported.
If the data balances, it is ready to replace the original GTAP5 data. However, in the case of
the Brazilian IO table, some parameters,  such as vdgm and vign,  are not disaggregated in the IO
table. We use data on total govemment demand to check for consistency, since these aggregate data
are available  in the IO table. However, we need dis-aggregated data to replace the original data in
GTAP. For this dis-aggregation we use the orginal GTAP5 shares.
The data from GTAP5 also need to be extracted and stored. We do this with a GAMS file
that reads the original GTAP5 dataset, which has been aggregated to the same number of
A-7commnodities used to relabel the IO data.
After we include  the files containing the data to be compared,  we create the parameters  tl-lat
will be used to compare both data sets. These parameters  will receive the values  of any original
parameter common between the two data sets, using  the new set created to differentiate the values
from the two different data sets.
Thlis last program can also be used to spli, the -variables that are not dis-aggregated  in the
original IO table, such as the data abouLt goverament  consumption and private consumption wlich
are not dis-aggregated  by origin. In addition, the originDl IO data on primary factors  are dis-
aggregated into only two factors, capital and labor. We  split these  data in sklled and unskilled labor,
land and capital. To split all these data we use lhe original GTAP5 shares for government and
private  demand, by origin,  arLd the original GIAP5 shares for prmnary factors.
Replacing the Brazilian IO data in ihe  GI'AP5
Now that all data that we want to replace are ready, we c reate a "definition file"  that will
specify the way in which we replace the original  GTA1'5  data by the new data. This file should have
the extension "def,"  and is placed in the "defines"  subdirectory used bythe GTAPinGAMS
programs.  The next example shows part of the  definition file in GAMS notation used in the case of
the Brazilian 10 table:
*  Redefines  to  intr-oduce  the  GTAP  IO  table  frorr  1996.
*  Read  the  IO  data  for  Brazil  in  1996:
$include  . .\iowork96\io.dat
set  bra(r)  /bra/;
loop (bra (r),
ty(i,r)  =  bty(i,2-);
ti(j,i,r)  =  bti(- ,i,r);
tp(i,r)  =  btp(i,r);
vafm(j,i,r)  =  bvELfm(j,i,r);
vfm(f,i,r)  =bvfPi(f,i,r':
vpmn(i,r)  =  vipm(:.,r)  +  vdpm(1 ,  r)
vipm(i,r)$vpm(i,r)  =  bvpm(i,r)  *  vipmCi,r)  /  vpm(i,r);
vdpm(i,r)$vpm(i,r)  =  bvprn(i,r)  *  vdpmCi,r)  /  vpm(i,r);
vgm(i,r)  =  vigm(:_,r)  + vdgm(1,r);
viqm(i,r)$vgm(i,2-)  =  bvgrn(i,r)  *  vigTm(i,r)  /  vgm(i,r);
vdgm(i,r)$vgm(i,r)  =  bvgrn(i,r)  *  vdcgm(i,r)  /  vgm(i,r);
Ihis example begins with the inclusion of the data ready to be rceplaced,  which is stored in the file
io.dat in the subdirectory iowork96. A set is dcefined for Brazil as a subset of the set r, whdich
identifies  the regions  in GTAP5. This allows the  process of data replacement to be applied only for
Brazil. The parameters to be modified are declared inside a loop over the set BRA(r).
In the Brazilian IO case, the paramteters to be  replaced  a;re the taxes  on production  (ty), taxes
on intermnediate consumption  (ti), taxes on private corsumption  (tp), intermediate  consumption
(vafm), use of primary factois (vfm),  private consumplion (vipm and vdpm)  and government
consumption (vigm, vdgm).  The data from thi  Bzazilian IO table was stored in the file io.dat with
the initial "b" for each paranmeter.
Private and government consumption are  split into domestic and imported components in
the definition file, using the original GTAP5 shares for domestic  and imported consumption. We
also undertake yet another consistency check of the IC data in the definition file.
A-8This define file will be used by the GTAPinGAMS programs  called by impose.bat to create  a
new balanced data set, imposing the new parameters  from the IO table on an existing GTAP data
set. The syntax of the commands to run the impose programs  are "impose target source," where
target is the name of the new data set to be created and source is the name of the data set from
which the original data is taken.
The programs called byimpose.bat replace the original data set by miirnizing the difference
between the original data and the new data, keeping the trade flows and trade protection data
unaltered. A new data set is created,  different from the original and from the IO data.
The impose.bat batch file is located in the "build" subdirectory of the GTAPinGAMS
programs.  This batch file is executed  by invoking the MS-DOS prompt from this subdirectory..  In
the case of the Brazilian IO table we type "impose  brazil ftaaio"  at the MS-DOS prompt (without
the quotation marks)  and press  enter. The name of the definition file is brazil and the name of the
source file is ftaaio.
The impose command will generate  a new data set named brazil.zip from the ftaaio.zip using
the information given in the file brazil.def in the "defines"  subdirectory. It also copies  the set
definition file ftaaio.set to brazil.set, and the mapping file ftaaio.map to brazil.map, in the "defines"
subdirectory. A summary echo-print  of trade and GDP shares for the new data set created is
generated and placed in the "build"  subdirectory.
Figure 1 shows a representation of the process used to update the data from GTAP5 with
data from the  1996 Bmrzilian 1O table.  This picture shows the preparation of the data in the
subdirectoryIowork96, created to do this work The first GAMS  file, get_orig_data.gms,  extracts
the data from the IO table in the fie Io_br_96.xls,  in Excel, and puts it in a dat file, Io_br_96.dat.
Then the file relabel.gmns  change the numbers associated with commodities  and sectors with
characters  matching GTAP notation. This infornation in saved in the file Io96_gtap.dat.  The file
diagonalize.gms  does some further adjustments  to the data, such as transforming the number of the
sectors to match the number of commodities,  transforming the data from Brazilian currency to US
dollar,  and rescaling  GDP to match the GTAP value for 1997. This information is then stored in
the file diagio.dat. The file Io_gtap.gms  redefines the IO data to match the GTAP arrays, checks the
consistency of the new data, and saves these data in file Io_gtap.dat.  File Gtap_io.gms reads the data
from files Io  gtap.dat and Gtap_io.dat, does some comparison between these data, and splits some
IO data, such as factor usage, using information from GTAP5. At this point all of the information
needed for the replacement of GTAP5 data by the Brazilian IO data is placed in the file lo.dat.
The data file Gtap_io.dat was created bythe file Gtapio.gms, which uses the file ftaaio.zip as
source for the data saved in Gtap_io.dat. The file ftaaio.zip was created by the GTAPinGAMS
aggregation routine, located in the impose subdirectory. Before running the aggregation routine it is
necessary to create the files  ftaaio.set and ftaaio.map, and to save these files in the defines
subdirectory.
The imnpose routine reads the files  Brazil.def, ftaaio.set and ftaaio.map to generate the new
dataset Brazil.zip, and copies the files ftaaio.set and ftaaio.map to new files Brazil.set and Brazil.map.
The file Brazil.def includes the IO data from the file io.dat. The impose program minimizes the
difference between the data assigned in the Brazil.def file and the equivalent data in the ftaaio.zip
file, generating the new re-calibrated data, Brasil.zip.
Comparison of exports and imports between the 1996 Brazilian IO table and GTAP5
Table 3 shows  data on exports and imports for Brazil in the GTAP5 database and in the
Brazilian  1996 IO table, re-labeled to match the GTAP classification of sectors. The IO table was re-
A-9scaled to have the same GTAP5 value of GDP, as explained above. All data are in 10 US$ billions.
The total of exports is a slightly differenit in the two data sets. Some big differences  can be
identified in sectors OCR (0.39 in GTAP5 and 0.035 billions in 1096), OFD (0.187 in GTAP5,
0.625 in I096), P_C (GTAP5 0.037 in GT_AP5  and 0.1:7 in I096), TRD (0.327 in GTAP5 and C'.713
in I096), and OBS (0.286 in GTAP5 and 0.139  in I096).
The difference between the total of imports in the two data sets is a little larger than the
difference in exports.  The GTAP5 data show a higher level of imports for Brazil than the I096 data:
US$ 8.982 billions compared to US$ 8.079 billions.  The larger difEerences  occur for sectors P_C
(0.22 in GTAP5 and 0.658 in I096), OME  (1.816 in GTAP5 and 1.405 in 1096), ELY (0.216 in
GTAP5 and 0.11 in I096), OBS (0.394 in GTAP5 and 0.279 in I1096),  and OSG (0.155 in GT-AP5
and 0 in I096).
Differences  between the two data sets could arise for several reasons.  The GTAP5 database
uses trade statistics for 1997, and the IO table hLas data for 1996, re-scaled to match the GDP value
of 1997. The GTAP5 data uses infomnation from many different sources, such as the COMTRADE
database from United Nations and the bilateral trade flows reported by different countries. The
Brzilian IO table uses the statistics produced bythe Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Commerce and
Trade.  Another possible source of differences  in the sectoral values of trade can be a
misinterpretation  in the process of re-labeling the comirLodities  anld sector of the IO table to maLtch
the GTAP5 classification.  The differences in the trade statistics for the sector P_C, for example,
could be due to a problem in the re-labeling process, or a differerLt classification in the raw data of
the GTAP and the IO table, since the levels of exports and imports for this sector are much lover in
the GTAP5 data than in the I096 data. Some of the products from the correspondent sector P  C
(petroleum and coal products)  in the Brazilian IO table can be considered  as products of the CRP
industry (chemical, rubber and plastic products).
Input-output sectors  and conunodity mapping to GIAP5
Brazilian  10 ccvmlitev
set  ios Input-output Commodities froim  the 1996  Brazilian :[O  table
/
1  Coffee






8  Bovine and swine
9  Raw milk
10  Poultry and birds  (alive)
11  Other agriculture products
12  Iron mining
13  Other minerals
14  Petroleum and gas
15  Coal and other
16  Mineral products non metallic
17  Metallurgical basic products
18  Steel sheet
A-1019  Primary non-ferrous metal
20  Other primary metallurgical products
21  Manufacture and maintenance of machines and equipments
22  Tractors and embank machines
23  Electric material
24  Electronic equipment
25  Automobiles  - trucks and bus
26  Other vehicle and parts
27  Wood and lumber products  furniture
28  Paper - cellulose - pulp and printing
29  Rubber products
30  Chemical elements non petrochemical
31  Alcohol of  sugar and cereals
32  Pure gasoline
33  Fuel oils
34  Other products  from refine
35  Petrochemical basic products
36  Resin
37  Gas with alcohol
38  Fertilizers
39  Ink
40  Other chemical products
41  Pharmaceutical and perfumery products
42  Plastic articles
43  Natural textile strings
44  Natural textiles
45  Artificial textile strings
46  Artificial textiles
47  Other textile products
48  Wearing apparel
49  Leather products and footwear
50  Coffee products
51  Processed rice
52  Wheat flour
53  Other processed vegetal products
54  Meat of bovines
55  Meat of poultry
56  Processed milk
57  Other dairy products
58  Sugar
59  Crude vegetal oils
60  Refined vegetal oils
61  Other food products - inclusive animal feed
62  Beverages
63  Other manufactures
64  Industrial  services of public utilities
65  Construction
66  Trade margins
A-l167  Transportation rnargins
68  Communication
69  Insurance
70  Financial services
71  Lodging and food
72  Other services
73  Private health and education
74  Services provide tc companies
75  Rent of propertiLes
76  Rent imputable
77  Public administration
78  Public health
79  Public  education
80  Private  services non commercials
81  External  operations without exchange emission
82  Total  /;
Mapping from the GTAP5 sectors to the com=odities  in the 10  table  (presented by numbers)
set  mapi(i,ios)  /
PDR.3,  FM]D.2  ,
GRO.7,  MV4.  (25,26)

























Brazian  10 sears:
A-12set  jos  Sectors  in the IO  table  /
1  Agriculture
2  Mineral extraction
3  Petroleum and gas extraction
4  Non-metallic minerals
5  Metallurgy
6  Non-ferrous metallurgy
7  Other metallurgy
8  Machines and tractors
9  Electric material
10  Electronic equipment
11  Automobiles - trucks and buses
12  Other vehicles and parts
13  Wood and furniture
14  Paper and publishing
15  Rubber industry
16  Chemical elements
17  Petroleum refine
18  Several chemicals
19  Pharmaceutical  and perfumery
20  Plastic goods
21  Textile industry
22  Clothing apparel
23  Footwear
24  Coffee  industry
25  Vegetable products processing
26  Animal  slaughter
27  Dairy industry
28  Sugar industry
29 Vegetable oil  fabrication
30  Other food products
31  Several industries





37  Financial institutions
38  Services provided to families
39  Services provided to firms
40 Rent of properties
41  Public administration
42  Private services non-commercials
43  Financial dummy
Total  of activity /;
Code created to identi* and aggregate the IO sectors:
set  j  Sectors /
AGR  Agriculture
COG  Coal  - petroleum and gas  extraction
MIN  Mineral extraction
ANS  Animal slaughter
VOF  Vegetal oil fabrication
DAI  Dairy industry
OFO  Other food products  (coffee industry - beverages - tobacco)
SUG  Sugar industry
TXT  Textile industry
CLA  Clothing apparel industry
A-13FOO  Footwear
WOF  Wood and furniture
PAP  Paper and publishing
PTR  Petroleum refine
CRP  Chemicals  - rubber and plastic
NMT  Non-metallic minerals
MET  Metallurgy  (iron and steel)
NFE  Non-ferrous metallurgy
OME  Other metallurgy
AUT  Automobiles  - trucks and buses
OVP  Other vehicles and parts
ETE  Electronic equipment
MEQ  Other machine & equipment  (machiaes-trac_ors-electric material)
SVI  Several industries





FiI  Financial institutions
OSE  Other services
PAD  Public administration
PSN  Private services non-commercials
FDM  Financial dummy - will be split among the other sectors/;
Mapping from the codes  to the Brazilian IO sectors:




















A-14Appendix B: Tariff  Rates in Brazil
This appendix explains how and why we correct the GTAP database of protection for
Brazil. We show that our corrected version of the GTAP database of Brazilian protection closely.
represents the common external tariff for MERCOCSUR,  where the latter is aggregated to the 57
GTAP sectors.
The two corrections we make to the GTAP database  of protection for Brazil are to impose
zero tariffs and subsidies on services sectors  and to impose MERCOSUR  (i.e., zero tariffs)  on
intra-MERCOSUR trade. We show that the irnplied collected tariff with our corrected GTAP
database of Brazilian tariffs is close to, but slightly larger than, the actual collected tariff of Brazil.
The remaining difference between our implied collected tariff and the actual tariff reflects
preferential arrangements  not incorporated in the GTAP database, and exemptions to the tariff such
as duty drawback.
Average  aggregate collected tariff rate
We begin by calculating the average collected tariff rate in aggregate.  This will give us a point
of comparison for the disaggregated data.  That is, we will be able to assess whether the micro data,
when aggregated, is consistent with the reported macro aggregates.
Data on tariff revenue domes from two sources and are available in Brazilian Reals (R$). The
monthlyvalues from the two sources  (the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank) and are listed
in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1. We convert these data to US dollars in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.
In Table 2 we calculate  the aggregate  average collected tariff rate in Brazil based on our two
calculations for the tariff revenue from Table 1. Our data source for the value of imports provides
the data in US dollars.
To complement these data, we note that the Federal Revenue Agency of the Ministry of
Finance, reported that the average effective  tariff in December of 1999  was 7.99%. This is close to
the values we calculated in Table 2.
Value  of average  collected  tariff rate and total collected tariffs in GTAP5
In Table 3 we list the sectors in the GTAP5 database along with the value  of imports and
tariff revenue in millions of US dollars.  We then calculate  the gross tariff rate by sector and present
this in the third column.
Based on the data in Table 3, the average aggregate collected tariff rate in GTAP is 12.15%.
This value is obtained dividing the total of the tariff revenue by the total of imports where the latter
includes transport costs and the tariff.  This tariff rate, however, was calculated under the
assumption that it applies on MERCOSUR imports as well; thus, an adjustment is required.
Impact of correcting the collected tariffs in GTAP considering MERCOSUR
The GTAP database does not incorporate the MERCOSUR agreement.  In other words, the
tariff rates between the countries that form MERCOSUR are not zero in the GTAP database. In
general, the MERCOSUR agreement applies zero tariffs between the members and a common
extemal tariff (CEI). This implies that the collected tariffs and tariff revenue in GTAP overestimate
real collected tariffs.
We calculated the total collected tariffs in GTAP5, after subtracting the value of tariffs
collected on imports from Argentina and Uruguay, as $US  8.326 billion.  IThis compares to $US
A-1S10.962 billion with tariffs on inports from Uruguay and Argentina. After correcting for zero tariffs
on MERCOSUR imports, the implied collected tariff rate in GTAP5 for Brazil is 9.23%. The
difference  between the 9.23%  (after correcting for services  and MERCOSUR) and the actual 8%/c
collected rate most likely reflects  some preferenlial tradiLg arrangements  not incorporated in the
GTAP dataset and exemptions to the tariff such  as duty drawback.
The Common External Tariff of MER3LCOSOR, compared to GTAP tariffs for Brazil
An alternate choice for the tariff data is the legal  MERCOSLJR rates. It would be useful to
know the relationship  of the GTAP tariff to the legal tariff rates of MERCOSUR  However,
MERCOSUR has about ten thousand tariff lines.  It is a nontrivial  and time consuming task to
aggregate these ten thousand tariff lines into the into the 57 GTA]' sectors. However,  we perfonned
this mapping so that we could know the correspondence  between the structure of tariffs applied in
GTAP and the CET of MERCOSUR
The sources  of information to undertake  this aggregation  were the tables  available  in the
Central Bank and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Conimerce listing the nominal rate of
the GET in MERCOSUR  These tables are divided into "sections and chapters"  of similar products.
For example, there is a section of vegetable products, divided into chapters of living plants, fruits,
cereals, etc. Some tables have  the average, medimn and rnodal values of the CET for each chapter.
Since one chapter can has mnny different value  of tariffs for different products, alternative
procedures were used to estimate the CET for each product aggregated in the GTAP format. The
results are in Table 4.
We observe that the tariff rates in GTAP are relatively close to the estimated CET
aggregated to the GTAP sectors. The simple average of the tariffs is very close.
Conclusion
These results show that the GTAP tariff levels closely reflect the MFN rates  of the conmmon
external tariff of MERCOSURF  Moreover, once we con-ect the GTAP database by imposing zero
tariffs on imports from Argentina and UruLguay, the implied collected tariff in the GTAP database is
close to, but somewhat  larger than, the actual collected  tariff in Brazil. Remaining differences  in the
collected rates reflect preferential arrangements not incorporated :n the GTAP database and
exemptions to the tariff such as duty drawback We conclude that the GTAP database, as corrected,
is a reasonable protection database to employ to analyze Brazilian trade policy.
A-16Appendix C: Calculation of Brazilian Factor Share Data
Data on factor shares in Brazilian industries are crucial in explaining the link between trade
reform and poverty. It is well known, however, that the data on capital's share in national input-
output tables in the agriculture  and services sectors  are notoriously unreliable.  Thus, one purpose of
this appendix is to present the data we have calculated on labor and capital shares in Brazilian
industries and explain how we derived thern
In addition, the Brazilian input-output table does not present data on the decomposition of
labor's share into skilled and unskilled labor payments. We also explain the procedure we employed
to dis-aggregate the total labor payments  into to skilled and unskilled labor in the Brazilian sectors.
Labor and capital shares in agriculture
The convention of the national statistical authorities who produce the IO tables in most
countries is to calculate capital's share in a sector as a residual: the difference between the value of
output and the payments to intermnediates, taxes and labor.  Sectors like services  and agriculture
contain a large share of self employed, temporary and informal workers.  Since tax payments to the
government for these workers are under-reported, the official statistics  also under report labor
payments.  As a consequence of this, payments to agriculture  labor in the  1995 Brazilian IO table
(Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica  - IBGE, [2001dj)  are about 13%  of the payments to
capital and labor. This suggests, contrary to conventional wisdom,  that the agriculture sector in
Brazil is capital intensive.
We held the total value  added in each of the Brazilian agricultural sectors unchanged, based
on the IO table. The Brazilian IO table has the value added only for the aggregate of the agricultural
sectors. Thus, it was necessaryto  decompose  aggregate capital payments into capital payments to
each agricultural sector and to obtain the value of payments to labor for each agricultural sector.
The payments  to labor for the agricultural sectors  were calculated based on data from the 1995/96
Brazilian  Census of Agriculture  (IBGE [2001cT. The total number of people employed in
agricultural sectors (including temporary labor, owners and family members)  was multiplied by 2
times the minimum wage in Brazil for 1995 to obtain the total payment to the agricultural labor and
the payment to labor for each agricultural sector in the GTAP model. Table 2 lists the results for
each sector. The value of total payments to the agricultural labor was subtracted from total value
added in agricultural sector, obtained from the  1995 Brazilian IO table, to obtain the aggregate  value
of capital paymnents  in agriculture.
In order to obtain capital payments  by sub-sector within agriculture, we used the number of
tractors  used in each agricultural sector (data available  in the 1995/96 Brazilian  Census of
Agriculture)  as a proxy for total capital use by agricultural sector. We multiplied the total value of
capital payments, obtained  as described above, by the share of tractors used in each agricultural
sector, to obtain capital payments in each agricultural sector. Note, however, that the sum of capital
and labor payments obtained at this stage will not be in general equal value added in the sector from
the IO table. Thus, we used the estimated labor and capital payments by sector as the basis for
calculating the share of labor and capital payments  in each sector, but we held value added from the
IO table fixed.
The Brazilian Census of Agriculture  does contain infornation about the wool (WOL) sector.
For wool, we used the shares for the aggregate agriculture  sector as the shares for the wool sector.
The choice of 2 times the minimum wage as the average wage payment to unskilled agricultural
workers was based on our estimate that the industrial sectors are paying unskilled labor about 3.33
A-17times the minimum wage (based on the data from the 1995  10 table and the 1996 Brazilian Survey
of Industry contained in IBGE [19981).  The above procedure produced a labor share of 80.6% of
value added. This share is consistent with the labor shares obtained byIFPRI researchers  mentiorLed
above.
Labor and capital shares in services  sectors
The 1998/99 Brazilian Survey of Services  (IBGE [2001et  has data about labor payrnents
and value added for sorne service sectors: trade (D),  ground transportation (OTP), water
transportation (WIP), air transportationi (ATP), communication  (QMN), financial activities  (OF),
insurance  (ISR), business  activities  (OBS), recreational and other services  (ROS). For these sectors,
we calculated labor's share as labor payments divided 'byvalue added, and capital's share  as one
minus labor's share.
The construction sector (CNS) does not appear in the survey of services. However, there is a
separate Annual Brazilian Survey of the Construction Industryfor 1995  (IBGE [2001b3,  which we
used to obtain data about average payments to labor.  This average payment was multiplied by the
number of people employed in this sector, shown in the 1995 Brnzilian IO table, to obtain the
payments to labor in this sector. We calculated labor's share as labor payments divided by value
added, from the IO table, and capital's share as one mninus  labor's share.
The Brazilian survey of services does not have information  about the following GTAP5
service sectors: electricity (ELY), gas manufacture  and distributio a (GDT), water treatment and
distribution (WTR), govermnent services  (OSG) and dwellings  (])WE). The first three sectors are
related to government activities in Brazil. Assuming that the government is informed about labor
payments in these sectors, we keep the original capital and labor shares  in the 1995 IO table. The
OSG sector shows a labor share of 100% in the 10 table, and the DWE sector does not exist irL the
IO table. Since it is not possible to produce  output without some capital, we imposed a minimum
capital share in these sectors. The niniinum share came, from the trade sector, which has the lowest
capital share among the service sectors.
The capital and labor shares were considered the same for the service sectors ground
transportation (OTP), water transportation (WIP) and air transportation  (ATP), because of lack of
dis-aggregated information.  The same assumpti.on was applied to the sectors financial activities
(OH) and insurance (SR),  and electricity (ELi), gas rrmanufactura and distribution  (GD`I)  and  water
treatment and distribution (WTR).
Labor and capital shares in industrial sectors
We kept the labor and capital shares in industrial sectors  as they appear in the  1995 IO table.
Hoowever, the industrial GTAP sectors PCR (processed. rice) and B_T (beverages and tobacco)  are
not dis-aggregated  in the Brazilian IO table. We used data from the  1995 Annual Brazilian Survey of
Mining and Manufacturing Industries  (IBGE  [200 la3  to calculate it. This 1995 survey of industry
has data about total payments to labor and total assets, for both sectors. We assumed 9%  as a rate of
return on capital to calculate capital payments from total assets.  T  he labor and capital shares were
calculated dividing the payments to each factor by the total payments to both factors.
Splitting the labor payments to skilled and unskilled labor
Manufaauig
Brazilian statistics about payments to skdlled and unskilled labor are scarce. We used data
from the1996 Brazilian Survey of Industries  (IBGE [19983)  to calculate it. The survey of industries
A-18has the total number of people employed and the total payments, byindustry. It also has the number
of people and payments divided in three different categories: salaried people linked to production,
salaried people not linked to production, and non-salaried people. These three categories  are defined
in the survey as:
*  Salaried people linked to production: people directly remunerated by the firm,  occupied in
the activities  of production of industrial goods and services, maintenance and repair of
industrial equipment, and direct support to the production.
*  Salaried people not linked to production: people directly remunerated  by the fm,  occupied
in the activities of indirect support to the production, as administrative activities, security,
cleaning, accounting, managerial control, merchandise,  non-industrial services,
transportation, construction, agricultural, etc.
*  Non-salaried people: owner or partner with activities in the firm, including family members
without remuneration.
The number of people normally linked to production is much higher than the number of people in
the other two categories.  The number of non-salaried people is  small in all industrial sectors. We
considered the salaried people linked to the production as unskilled workers, and the salaried people
not linked to production plus non-salaried people as skilled workers. We then calculated the share of
payments to unskilled labors and skilled labors in each industrial sector, dividing the payments to
each category by the total payments to labor in each sector.
The GTAP sectors  COL (mineral coal,  OIL (crude petroleum extraction) and GAS  (crude
gas extraction)  have equal unskilled and skilled shares, because of a lack of dis-aggregated
information in the survey of industry. The same happens for the sectors OAT (bovine, sheep and
horse meat) and OMT (meat of other animals).
Sev*s andAgiad
We were unable to find data about different labor categories in agriculture  and service
sectors for the Brazilian economy. To decompose labor payments in these sectors we used two
proxies for the data. For relative wages, we used the ratio of unskilled to skilled wages in the
industrial sectors of Brazil  For the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers  we used data from
comparable economies in these sectors.
The ratio of unskilled to skilled wages in the industrial sectors  was obtained from the  1996
Brazilian survey of industry.  The average wage of each labor category was obtained dividing the total
payments to each category by the total number of people employed in that category.  Taking a
weighted average for all industry in Brazil. the ratio of the wage of unskilled to skilled wages  was
0.57.
The ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in each sector in other countries  comes from the
2000 OECD Employment Outlook. Table 1  shows the kind of information available. The service
sectors are divided by OECD into 4 sub-groups: producer services (business  & professional,
financial, insurance, real estate); distributive services  (retail trade, wholesale trade, transportation,
communication); personal services  (hotels & restaurants, recreational & amusement, domestic and
other services);  social services (government proper, health, education,  miscellaneous); and
construction. The GTAP sectors may be classified in the following way. producer services: business
activities  (OBS), financial activities  (OFT), insurance  (TSR); distributive services: trade  MRD),  ground
transportation (OIP), water transportation (WIP), air transportation  (ATP), communication
(CMN); personal services: recreational and other activities  (ROS), dwellings  (DWE); social services:
government services  (OSG); and construction: construction  (CNS). For the sectors electricity
A-19(ELY), gas manufacture  and distribution (GD'I), water treatment and distribution  (WTR),  which do
not easily map into any of the OECD classified sectors, we choose to take the average for all of
services considered in the OECD data.
We used data for Portugal as a proxy for Brazil, because it seems closest to the Brazilian
economy in these sectors. The shares of skilled and unskilled workers in the agriculture  and service
sectors for Brazil were calculated using the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers in Portugal.
Based on the above logic, we have the following two variables  as data:
R = ratio of unskilled to skilled wages (known from the industry data)
LR  ratio of unskilled to skilled workers  employed (known from OECD)
We seek the share that goes to unskilled and skilled labor. By definition, unskilled labor's share is
Wux Lu /  [Wux Lu + Ws xLs ], where W is wages, L is labor and the subscripts U and S refer to
unskilled and skilled labor respectively. Multiplying both numerator and denominator of the
preceding expression by 1, in the form of  [1/ WsxL5 ] /  [1/ WsxLs ], we end up with
WuxLu/  [WuxL  WsxLs]  =  RxLR/[RxLR  +1].
The variables  on the right are data, which allow the calculation of the share of unskilled labor since  1
minus this value is skilled labor's share.
This procedure was used to each service sector, using the classification of services sectors
explained above. For agricultural sectors, the shares of payments  to skilled and unskilled labor were
calculated  for the aggregate  agricultural sector, and then considered the same for all GTAP
agricultural sectors, since the OECD does not show dis-aggregated  data for agricultural sectors.
Table 2 shows the shares of capital, unskilled and skilled labor obtained after all these procedures.
A-20Appendix D: Survey Data on Brazilian Households
The primary source of information on each of the households  in the model is a survey
undertaken in Brazil in 1996 and 1997 by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE).
The survey is called Pesquisa Sobre Padroes de Vida, and is often referred to by the resulting
acronym PPD. We will refer to it as the LSMS survey, in reference to it being one of the Living
Standards  and Measurement Survey series. The geographic coverage included the Northeast and the
Southeast of Brazil, spanned 19,409 individuals in 4,940 households, and covers  73% of the
Brazilian population. Information was collected on consumption, income, health, education,  labor
force participation,  and wages & salaries.
For our purposes the most attractive feature of the LSMS is that it simultaneously included
information on the consumption and income of each household. There are several surveys  that
provide one or the other, but none that we are aware of for Brazil in recent times that collects both.
This connection is particularly important for our purposes, since we stress the fact that household
welfare depends on both changes in real income and changes in the purchasing power of that
income. Indeed, this is arguably the only reason that one moves from a partial equilibrium analysis
of household consumption data to a full-blown CGE  model.2
There  are three main stages in our analysis of the LSMS data: extracting data on income
sources,  extracting data on expenditure patterns, and re-balancing the household data with the
remainder of the model. The "bottom line'  from our analysis of the LSMS data is Table 4 in the
main report; we document the steps taken to arrive at those values.
1. Income Sources
The LSMS data allow us to identify the share of income received from various  sources. We
assign the observed income to factors in three stages:
*  Adjustments to apparent profits to correct for measurement error, and the direct assignment
of sources of income other than wages and apparent profits. This stage utilizes information
in the LSMS questionnaire directly.
*  An apnoni  assignment of remaining "apparent profits" to the factors  labor, capital and land,
stressing the general belief that the poorest households  in a developing country such as
Brazil have very litde access to capital and land ownership (in the sense that they generate
monetary returns).
*  An adjustment of this a  proni  mapping based on some information we have on selected
households  as to their detailed occupation.  This information is used selectively, but we
believe justifiably, to identify households whose  "apparent profits"  are likely due completely
to their labor or not at all to land.
All detailed steps in our calculation are documented in the Stata program BRAZIL LSMS
ANALYSIS.DO. It uses data collated in the Stata program BRAZIL LSMS DATA.DO.  We report interim
calculations from these Sata programs  below, to facilitate readers  identifying the precise steps
underlying each calculation.
The following LSMS variables were mapped into wages income:
2 An additional feature  of the LSMS  is that it contains information at the level of the individual.  Hence it is
possible for us to extend our analysis to look at the effects of individuals within households, even if that is beyond
the scope of the present study.
A-21V06B51  Last gross wage received
V06B54  Extra revenue  was received with the last salary
V08A02  Revenue from retirement or pension from public -welfare institute  (last month)
V08A04  Revenue from retirement or pension fioro  private welfare institute  (last month)
V08A06  Revenue  from  bonus of permanence in the job (ast month)
V08A13  Revenue from compensation  or worker debts (last month)
V08A19  Revenue  frorL unemployment  insurance  (last morLth)
Some of these items are incluides  as wages income even though they represent deferred
compensation. All items were adjusted to be on the samne annual basis.
Capital income was initially set equal to the LS'\4S variab]le V08Al 1, Revenue from
dividends, sale of stock, revenue from saving account  (last month).
Income from land was set equal to the LSMS variable  VC08A17, Revenue  from rent or sale of
property (last month).
Apparent profits were kept separate from the olther factor incomes, since we needed to
allocate them separatelyto each factor as explained later.  Apparent profits were defined from the
LSMS variables:
V06B22  Did you receive  some net revenue in your companly, firm, business (last month)?
V06B23  Value of the net revenue  (last mrionth)
V06B24  Did you receive some net revenue in yotur company, firnn,  business  (last year)?
V06B25  Value of the net revenue  (last year)
Some care was taken to examine the monthlyand annual reports closely, since there are strengths
and weaknesses of using each (the monthly report likel[y suffers  less from recall problems, but the
annual report likely better represents the general level of profits  rather than some extreme month).
When both monthly and annual profits were reported by the same individual,  an average of the
annualized amount was used.
Finally, other non-factor income  was defined from the following  SMSE  variables:
V08A08  Revenue fom life insurance  (ast  month)?
V08AO10  Revenue from alimony (last month)?
V08A15  Revenue fom heritage, gambling orlotteryprizes,  (ast  month)?
V08A21  Revenue from donations,  gifts, sent by people outside the house
V08A23  Revenue from other sources
Aggregating these categories of income for each household, we obtain distribution of
average income sources from the LSME  shown in Table D1.
The next stage is to assign the share in Table Dl listed as apparent profits to factors of
production. On apprioi  grounds we  make the initial attribution shown in Table D2, based on the
income decile of the household.  This is an initwi attribution since we add additional infornation on
the occupations of (the primary income earner in) each household later. We remain open to
replacing these a pribi  values with empirically 'based data if the right survey can be found.
We also utilize information on the detailed occupation of the primary wage earner of the
household to further refine the apportionment of apparent profits. Using the assignment in Table
D2 as a base, we adjusted individual households based on their major occupation. For certain
A-22occupations,  listed as self-employed agricultural workers, we expect that all of the apparent profits
wvould be a return to labor, and assign none to capital or land. For certain occupations, such as
unskilled workers in manufacturing and domestic service, we expect that all of the apparent profit
would be a return to labor and capital, and none to land; in these cases we therefore  assign the share
for land to capital  and leave the share for labor the same. The end result of these adjustments is  that
the percent apportionment to factors changes to the shares shown in Table D3. The main
adjustments between Tables D2 and D3 are for the poorest rural households, effectively increasing
the share apportioned to labor. Applying the apportionment in Table D3 to the original shares
results in Table D1, the decomposition of the factor income of household types is shown in Table
D4.
Table D5 reports the break-down of payments to labor into skilled and unskilled shares. This
breakdown uses information in the LSMS on the detailed occupational category of the primary
income  earlier in each household. These data are also defined in terms of skill categories, following
the standard Brazilian occupational categories.  More refined breakdowns than "skilled" and
"unskilled"  are available in the LSMS data. Table 4 in the main report joins the information in
Tables D4 and D5, by multiplying the skilled and unskilled labor shares in Table D5 by the share
attributed to aggregate labor in Table D4.
2. Expenditure Shares
The LSMS provides information  on the expenditures  of each household, broken down by a
wide range of goods and services. For example,  within food consumption the data differentiate
between expenditures for beef and pork Within services, the data differentiates  between weddings
and alimony (referring to future services and past services, respectively).  The survey data
differentiate  68 separate expenditure  categories,  including 28 within food. This provides an
opportunity to map the distribution of expenditure  shares to the rest of the CGE model at a
relatively fine  leveL allowing a richer specification of how the cost of living might vary across
households as relative prices  change.
At an aggregate  level, the data also reveal an important diversity in expenditure patterns as
one differentiates  the households  by income and region (rural/urban).  This point is potentially
important for the way in which the distributional effects of trade policies are captured in CGE
models. These points may not be new to poverty analysts, but have not been accounted for in most
CGE analyses  of trade policy.
To see the general issue, we focus on four broad expenditure  categories: housing, food,
consumer goods, and services.  This represents a heavy aggregation of the available data, but allows
us to see the main point. The first figure shows the distribution of expenditure shares in each of
these categories across the 4,932 households. These are not estimated shares from some statistical
model that has a sampling distribution; each panel simply represents the distribution of 4,932 shares
derived from the expenditure  reports of each household. In each panel we also show lines indicating
the median and mean expenditure share  (in the top left panel these lines overlap).
Two points emerge from these charts. First, the range of expenditure shares is wide in the
case of housing and food, suggesting that there is considerable diversity of expenditure patterns in
these two categories across households. Second, the distributions for all categories except housing
are highly skewed, such that there is a potentially important difference  between estirates of central
tendency based on the mean and the median. These differences  are not dramatic at the level of the
single, representative household, but become significant as we differentiate households.
To explore the possible sources of this diversity we partition the household according to two
A-23characteristics:  whether the household is located in an urban or rural region of BraziL and which
income decile it is  in. The expenditure  shares employed in the CGE model, reported in Table 4 of
the report, reflect this diversity.
3. Ensuring Consistency
Before including multiple households in the database for the model, we must dis-aggregate
our estimates of aggregate factor endowments  and expenditures  in Brazil for each household. For
example, based on the GTAP database and our additions, we have estimates of the value of
aggregate unskilled labor in Brazil. We need to apportion this number across the households of the
model. This must be done for all sources of incomes  (factors of production, as well as transfers). A
constraint on this allocation is  that each household must receive the share of income that we
estimate for it from the ILSMS.  Similar allocations of aggregate expenditures for each good must be
undertaken.
To build a bridge from the LSMS data to the GTAP-augmented database,  we employed a
formal "least squares"  minimization problem. The objective of the minimization problem was the
deviation of the shares of income sources and expenditure patterns from the values extracted above
from the LSMS.  That is,  we sought to find the new shares that would balance the data set but that
would be as close as possible to the originally extracted  shares. The computer implementation of
this problem is contained in the CAMS program LSMS.GMS.
Table D6 shows the income  shares that are generated after this adjustment process.
Although these are relatively close to the shares generated from the LSMS  and our adjustments, as
described above, there are some significant differences  for the four richest rural households. Two of
them are represented as have virtually all of their income from Capital. We therefore imposed
weights on the objective function of the least squares minimization problem so as to require that the
re-balancing algorithm put greater weight on getting the Capital income shares for these four
households  right, in the sense of being closer to those specified from the LSMS data. The resulting
solution is shown in Table D7, which is much closer to the shares from the data. We use the values
in Table D7 in our model.
A-24Table D1: Initial Assignment of Household Income
variable name  description
-ac  Share  of____  income_______  from labor_______
ISfacW  Share of  income from labor
ISfacK  Share of  income from capital
ISfacL  Share of  income from land
ISfacP  Share of income from apparent profits
ISnonfac  Share of income  from sources other than factors
HHDtype  |  ISfacW  ISfacK  ISfacL  ISfacP  ISnonfac
------------- +------------------------------------------------__
Rural hhd 1 |  0.560  0.015  0.014  0.189  0.222
Rural hhd 2  0.760  0.002  0.000  0.125  0.113
Rural hhd 3 |  0.821  0.001  0.032  0.139  0.007
Rural hhd 4  0.631  0.000  0.041  0.107  0.222
Rural hhd 5 |  0.363  0.000  0.000  0.585  0.052
Rural hhd 6 |  0.660  0.000  0.000  0.317  0.023
Rural hhd 7  0.603  0.000  0.000  0.397  0.000
Rural hhd 8  0.567  0.000  0.000  0.358  0.075
Rural hhd 9 |  0.491  0.000  0.000  0.509  0.000
Rural hhd 10  |  0.763  0.000  0.000  0.237  0.000
Urban hhd 1 |  0.643  0.000  0.003  0.070  0.284
Urban hhd 2 |  0.803  0.001  0.001  0.057  0.139
Urban hhd 3  0.771  0.001  0.001  0.090  0.136
Urban hhd 4 |  0.658  0.001  0.065  0.175  0.101
Urban hhd 5  0.713  0.002  0.010  0.154  0.122
Urban hhd 6 |  0.785  0.000  0.021  0.131  0.063
Urban hhd 7 |  0.747  0.012  0.026  0.196  0.018
Urban hhd 8 |  0.742  0.002  0.027  0.182  0.047
Urban hhd 9 |  0.741  0.003  0.005  0.210  0.041
Urban hhd 10  |  0.665  0.010  0.041  0.234  0.050
------------- +--------------------------------------------------
Total  |  0.713  0.004  0.020  0.166  0.097
A-25Table D2: Initial Attribution of Apparent  PTrofits to Factors
variable name  description  _____
Pr2W  Percent of Apparent  Profit Attributed to Labor
Pr2K  Percent of Apparent Profit Attributed to Property
Pr2L  Percent of Apparent 'Profit  Attributed to Land
HHDtype  |  Pr2W  Pr2K  Pr2L
------------ __+-___________.______.__-______-_
Rural hhd 1  95.0  2,5  2.5
Rural hhd 2  |  90.0  5.0  5.0
Rural hhd 3  |  80.0  10.0  10.0
Rural hhd 4  |  70.0  15,0  15.0
Rural hhd 5  |  60.0  20.0  20.0
Rural hhd 6  |  50.0  25.0  25.0
Aural hhd 7  |  40.0  30.0  30.0
Rural hhd 8  |  30.0  ,5.0  35.0
Rural hhd 9  |  20.0  40.0  40.0
Rural hhd 10  |  10.0  45.0  45.0
Urban hhd 1  |  95.0  2.5  2.5
Urban hhd 2  |  90.0  5.0  5.0
Urban hhd 3  |  80.0  10.0  10.0
Urban hhd 4  |  70.0  15.0  15.0
Urban hhd 5  |  60.0  20.0  20.0
Urban hhd 6  |  50.0  25.0  25.0
Urban hhd 7  |  40.0  30,0  30.0
Urban hhd 8  |  30.0  35.0  35.0
Urban hhd 9  |  20.0  40.0  40.0
Urban hhd 10  10.0  45.0  45.0
_____-------_+-_____---_________----________
Total  |  52.0  24.0  24.0
A-26Table D3: Final Attibution of Apparent Profits to Factors
HHDtype  I  Pr2W  Pr2K  Pr2L
------------ +-_____________________________
Rural hhd 1  98.32  1.03  0.65
Rural hhd 2  95.63  2.65  1.71
Rural hhd 3  |  90.55  5.89  3.56
Rural hhd 4  |  79.14  13.01  7.85
Rural hhd 5  |  72.43  17.67  9.90
Rural hhd 6  70.35  18.60  11.05
Rural hhd 7  50.00  31.43  18.57
Rural hhd 8  |  39.80  35.70  24.50
Rural hhd 9  28.89  38.52  32.59
Rural hhd 10  29.21  40.96  29.83
HHDtype  |  Pr2W  Pr2K  Pr2L
------------ +-_____________________________
Urban hhd 1  95.26  3.09  1.65
Urban hhd 2  |  90.59  6.42  2.99
Urban hhd 3  |  80.86  13.19  5.95
Urban hhd 4  |  70.53  19.96  9.51
Urban hhd 5  60.66  26.15  13.19
Urban hhd 6  50.66  32.94  16.40
Urban hhd 7  |  40.42  37.06  22.52
Urban hhd 8  |  30.34  42.22  27.45
Urban hhd 9  |  20.00  45.36  34.64
Urban hhd 10  |  10.83  51.73  37.44
------------ +-_____________________________
Total  54.58  27.71  17.71
A-27Table D4: Final Assignment of Factor Incomes  by Household Type
HHDtype  I  ISfacW3  ISfacK3  ISfacL3  ISnonfac
_______+_-____  ________________________-____-__
Rhhdl  0.745  0.018  0.015  0.222
Rhhd2  0.886  0,.002  0.000  0.113
Rhhd3  0.958  0.002  0.033  0.007
Rhhd4  |  0.712  0.018  0.047  0.222
Rhhd5  |  0.832  0.079  0.037  0.052
Rhhd6  0.839  0.079  0.059  0.023
Rhhd7  0.762  0.230  0.009  0.000
Rhhd8  |  0.674  0.125  0.125  0.075
Rhhd9  |  0.592  0.204  0.204  0.000
RhhdlO  |  0.787  0.107  0.107  0.000
Uhhdl  i  0.709  0.002  0.004  0.284
Uhhd2  |  0.854  0.005  0.003  0.139
Uhhd3  |  0.844  0.018  0.002  0.136
Uhhd4  0.788  0.037  0.073  0.101
Uhhd5  0.808  0.048  0.022  0.122
Uhhd6  |  0.851  0.058  0.028  0.063
Uhhd7  |  0.826  0.096  0.060  0.018
Uhhd8  |  0.797  0.089  0.067  0.047
Uhhd9  |  0.783  0.102  0.073  0.041
Uhhdlo  |  0.688  0.122  0.139  0.050
_  ______+_-___  __-_______-  __________________-_
Total  |  0.795  0.058  0.050  0.097
A-28Table D5: Breakdown into Labor Categories
HHDtype  I  wageS  wageU
Rhhdl  0.073  0.927
Rhhd2  |  0.088  0.912
Rhhd3  |  0.103  0.897
Rhhd4  |  0.111  0.889
Rhhd5  |  0.119  0.881
HHDtype  |  wageS  wageU
______+___- ___  __  _______
Rhhd6  |  0.242  0.758
Rhhd7  |  0.113  0.887
Rhhd8  0.186  0.814
Rhhd9  0.267  0.733
RhhdlO  0.087  0.913
Uhhdl  i  0.009  0.991
Uhhd2  |  0.187  0.813
TJhhd3  |  0.106  0.894
Uhhd4  |  0.153  0.847
Uhhd5  |  0.263  0.737
Uhhd6  0.278  0.722
Uhhd7  |  0.350  0.650
Uhhd8  |  0.451  0.549
Uhhd9  |  0.564  0.436
UhhdlO  |  0.523  0.477
________+  __-____________  ____
Total  |  0.318  0.682
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Distribution of Broad  Expenditujre Shares in Brazil
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An important attraction of numerical simulation  models is that they can be replicated and
extended by others. To facilitate this, we provide details on how to run our model. We intend to
provide further documentation on the following web page:
HIT://DMSWEB.BADM.SC.EDU/GLENN/BRAZIL/DISTnIBuBuON/BraziLhtm
This web documentation will also provide access to further revisions of the model and applications.
The team members maybe contacted  at DTARR@WORLDBANK.ORG,  HARRISON@MOORE.SCEDU,
RUTHERFORD@C)LORADO.EDU  or ANGELO_GURGEL@YAHOO.COM.BR
To run the Brazil model you will need to have the latest version of GAMS, version 20.2.
This can be installed by obtaining the file SETUP.EXE  from your Friendly GAMS Distributor.  After
that is done, just execute it. You will be taken through a standard Wmdows installation. If you
accept the default location, your GAMS system directory will then be
c:\PRoGRAM FLEs\GAMS20.2
You will also be asked at the end of the installation process  if you want to copy your existing license
file, GAMSuLE .TXT, to this directory. Do so.
You will need to have a license that allows you to run the following solvers: CONOPT,
MPSGE, and PATH.
In order to use our batch files, you will have to put GAMS on the path in order to run it
from the DOS command line. The GAMS installation instructions in file WrN-INSTALL.PDF  provide
instructions  on how to do this.
In order to use the programs which make libinclude  calls you will also need to install some






Then just execute UNZ540XN.EXE  from Explorer, and run GAMsINIT.EXE  from Explorer.
At this stage you can change to the directory you have the Brazilian model code in and
execute REPLICATE.BAT for a heart-pounding replication. The batch file MAKE.BAT has some
leisurely pauses in the execution, so that you know where you are up to, but is computationally
identical.  The results are in directory.\MODEL.
The core model file is in directory .\MODEL in a file that is imaginatively called MODEL.GM.
This is the file that we would expect most trade policy modelers to want to review and modify as
appropriate. The various batch files in this directory can be modified easily to execute one
simulation at a time. Be sure to delete al  *.SOL files, in the .\MODEL\ourPuT directory, for the
simulations you are doing, otherwise you will just have the old SOL files.
For convenience,  all of the files you need (other than SETUP.EXE)  will be in directory
HTl?://DMSWEB.BADM.SCEDU/GLENN/BRAZlIJDISTRIBUIION/
A-33Appendix F: Systematic  Sensivity Analysis
To calibrate our model estimates of elasticities raust be assembled for primary factor
substitution, import demand, import source, and domestic demand, amongst the more irrportant for
our purposes. In the base model all elasticity vaLues  are assigned a prioi to values which we believe
are plausible central tendency estimates.  Since elasticity estirates  are subject to a margin of error,
our "remedy"  for this problern, which is endemic to any  large-scale  model of this kind, is to
undertake systematic sensitivity analyses of our major results with respect to plausible bounds on
these elasticities. Even if we are unable to specify a  pon& etimt  with any precision, our pliors over
the likely baw§ that these elasticities could take are quite strong. Tro the extent that our major
conclusions  are robust to perturbations  over these bounds, we do not see our uncertainty over
specific values of these elasticities  as a weakness of the model.3
Our sensitivity analysis employs the procedures developed  by Harison and Vinod [1992].
Essentially these procedures amount to a Monte  Carlo simulation exercise  in which a wide range of
elasticities are independently and simultaneously perturbed from their benchmark values. These
perturbations  follow prescribed  distributions, such as a t distribution with a specified standard
deviation and degrees of freedorn, or a uniform distribution over a specified range. For each Monte
Carlo run we solve the counter-factual policywith the selected sel: of elasticities.  This process is
repeated until we arrive at the desired sample size, in oLur case 500. The results are then tabulated as
a distribution, with equal weight being given (by construction)  to each Monte Carlo run. 'The uipshot
is a probability distribution defined over the enidogenoius  variables of interest. In our case we focus
solely on the welfare impacts  of the full FTAA scenario.
The sensitivity analysis we undertake  reflects a diffuse set of priors over the plausible
elasticity values. Specifically, it assumes that elasticities are drawn from a probability distribution,
typically uniform, over a specified interval. For the elaslicity of substitution between primary factors
in each sector we assume a univariate normal distribution4 in each sector using the point estimate of
1 as the mean and a standard deviations of 0.33 (the base model assumes the point estimates); for
the elasticity of substitution  between intermediate inputs and the value added composite in each
sector we assume a uniform distribution between 0 and 0.5 (the base model assumes  0); for the
elasticity of substitution between domestic products and imported products  we assume  a uniform
distribution between  10 and 20 (the base model assurm.es  15); for the elasticity of substitution
between imported products by source we assurme  a uniform distribution between 20 and 40 (the
base model assumes 30); for the elasticity of transformaLtion between domestic and export markets
we assume a uniform distribution between 3 and 7 (the base model assumes 5); and for the
elasticities of substitution between products in government demand and consumption demand for
each household we assume an interval between 0.5 and 1.5  (the base model assumes  1). If we find
that these wide ranges result in fragile inferences  about welfare effects, then the next step would be
3  These remnarks should not be interpreted as denying the value of any new enpirical work on generating
such elasticities. On the contrary,  any effort that could generate  better boundls on these point estimates is useful in
generating policy conclusions that carry greater credibility, even if those conclusions will still be probabilistic in
nature. Moreover, we do not consider sensitivity  analysis with respect to more general functional forms, even though
we share concerns with the restrictiveness  of some of the popular forms we  employ.
4  Truncated from below at 0 if need be.
A-34to employ data-based priors about plausible ranges.5
The results  are reported in Figures 2, 3 and 4.  The main welfare results for the base rnodel
are relatively robust to the range of elasticity perturbations  considered here. It is worth noting that
our sensitivity analysis is "local"  in the sense that we perturb trade elasticities around what we
believe are plausible values. Since we already know that the effects of the FTAA are sensitive to the
use of significantly lower "sort run" trade elasticities,  there is little point including that in our fonmal
sensitivity analysis. In other words, it is more informative  to present results conditional on short run
or long run assumptions, and then undertake local sensitivity analysis around the precise numbers
used to operationalize  either of those assumptions.
In Figure 2 we show the distribution of the results of our sensitivity analysis for Brazilian
welfare as a whole, measured here as a percent of consumption.  One critical point is  whether we
have the sign right when we predict welfare gains for Brazil, and these results confirm that we do.
There is  virtually no chance that Brazil will gain less than 0.3 percent of the value of its consumption
from the FTAA. It is slightly ironic, but nonetheless true, that one often needs to undertake
extensive numerical simulation with very precise numbers just in order to determine the sign of a
welfare change.
In Figure 3 we display the global distribution of welfare impacts from the FTAA, focussing
on the aggregate  welfare gains to the world (top left panel), the countries included in the FTAA (top
right pane]), the countries  excluded from the FTAA (bottom left pane]),  and the EU (bottom right
pane]).  In this case we report welfare in terms of billions of 1996 U.S.  dollars, and employ the same
horizontal scale to facilitate visual comparison of the gains and losses. The results confirm the point
estimates reported in Table  6A. We see that FTAA memnbers will gain at least $12 billion per year
with virtual certainty, and excluded countries will lose at least $6.7 billion US dollars from the FTAA
with virtual certainty.  The European Union will lose around $3  billion per year with virtual certainty.
Global welfare will increase by more than $3  billion per year with virtual certainty.  The sensitivity
results confirm the conclusions drawn from the point estimates regarding who the gainers  and losers
are at the aggregate country level.
In Figure 4 we display the impacts on the poorest households in Brazil, to confirm our
conclusion that the FTAA would be beneficial for them. Welfare is measured here as percent of
consurmption for that household type. We also display as a vertical line the "point estimate"
obtained from the simulations with the benchmark elasticities reported in Table 8a. Our results
suggest that the poorest urban and rural households will gain more than one percent of the value of
their consumption with probability close to one. The mnin inference from Figure 4 is that the
welfare gains we report based on the point estimates  appear to be robust to the sensitivity analysis
undertaken.
In Figures 5 and 6 we undertake  similar comparisons of the detailed welfare impacts for each
rural and urban household.  The only direct elasticity for these households that was varied was the
elasticity of substitution in demand (between 0.5 and 1.5, using a uniform distribution). However,  all
other elasticities were varied.
5 This data-based method was employed, for example, in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1993]. Harrison,
Jones, Wigle and Kimbell  [1994] advocated it as a means of minimizing the chance of overly fragile results from
such sensitivity analyses.  (See main text for citations.)
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